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Article 2

THE WORST CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
OF ALL TIME
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
A tumultuous decade ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the
case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' reaffirming, in slightly modified
form, the near-absolute constitutional right to abortion the Court had
created a generation earlier in Roe v. Wade.2 Like Roe before it, Casey
was both a hugely controversial and a hugely consequential decision.
Substantively, Casey's reaffirmation of an abortion right that trumps
essentially any government effort to restrict, limit, or prohibit abortion affects millions of lives a year, each year. On one view-the view
of the majority in Casey itself-the decision vindicates the freedom of
millions of women, indeed of all women (in the Court's formulation,
the abortion right is solely that of women, with no formal role for
fathers)" to control their own bodies and their own lives, by vesting in
every woman the unrestricted power, should she ever become pregnant by choice, by chance, or by unfortunate circumstance, to terminate the life of the human fetus that she is carrying in utero and that is
gestating within her womb, if she determines that the continued existence, and growth, of that embryonic human life might impair her
freedom, health, economic opportunities, or social situation in some
4
meaningful (or, for that matter, trivial) way.
*

Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I

would like to thank the Notre Dame Law Review for inviting me to submit this tenth
anniversary Article on Planned Parenthood v. Casey. I would also like to thank those
who graciously agreed to read this Article in draft form and absolve them of
responsibility for the words and ideas expressed.
1 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98 (invalidating spousal notification provisions of
Pennsylvania statute).
4 Under Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the constitutional right to abortion was plenary in the first trimester of pregnancy, and subject
to limitation in the second trimester only in the interest of the "health of the mother."
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64; see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. But if an abortion procedure
would not in any way endanger the mother's health, the reason for the mother's decision to abort the unborn child in the fourth to sixth months of pregnancy is irrelevant
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Merely to describe, in an unvarnished, direct manner, the freedom that Casey embraces and reaffirms is to suggest the stakes of the
case viewed from the side of the opposing view. Just as Casey implicates the freedom of millions of women to have an abortion, it implicates the human existence of millions of lives a year. If the human
embryo-which shortly later becomes a human fetus, and which not
long after that, in the natural course of its development, is recognizably a human unborn child-is morally entitled to be treated as a
under the analysis of Roe. Under the Roe/Doe fr-amework, the right to abortion in the
third trimester (that is, "subsequent to viability") may be limited by the state, "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother." Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. "Health," hiowever, is a legal term
of art in the abortion context. Roe's "life or health" exception to permissible abortion
regulation was explained in Roe's companion case of Doe v. Bolton as including a wish
to abort for "family" or "emotional" reasons and vested the appropriate medical juldgment in the agreement of the woman and the physician performing the abortion that
these considerations permitted an abortion even of a viable unborn child. Doe, 410
U.S. at 192, 195-201 (striking down any two-physician or hospital committee review
requirements); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (referring to the interest of the woman in
avoiding "a distressful life and fitre," the "[m]ental and physical health" drains of
caring for a child, the "distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child," the "problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
or otherwise, to care for it," and the "difficulties and continuing stigma" of being an
unwed mother). The result of this stylized definition of "health" is that, because of
the "health" exception to abortion regulation in the last trimester, the mother may
choose abortion for essentially any personal, family, or emotional reason, even in the
last three months of pregnancy. This broad formulation would appear to include a
right to abortion for essentially any reason.

Casey makes some slight modifications in the trimester fiamework of Roe (adopting instead a simpler viability/nonviability line, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-74, 878-79)
and in the threshold at which a regulation concerning abortion so affects the woman's freedom to choose to have an abortion as to constitute the claimed constitutional intury (an "undue burden" exists if a law has the "purpose or effect [of]
plac[ing] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before
the fetus attains viability," id. at 878), but neither of these changes would permit a
state to prohibit abortions prior to viability becatuse of the woman's reason for having
an abortion. As was the case under Roe, the woman is permitted to have an abortion,
prior to the child's ability to live outside the womb, for any reason. As to abortions
after the point of viability (a point not necessarily congruent with the third trimester,
as in Roe, btIt potentially extending somewhat earlier), Casey explicitly retained and

reaffirmed Roe's approach, including the sweeping "health" exception to permissible
state regulation or prohibition of late-term abortions. Id. at 872-74; see also Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-38 (2000) (relying on "health" exception to invalidate a
Nebraska law prohibiting "partial-birth" abortion even after the point of viability);
accord id. at 947-51 (O'ConnorJ., concurring). The result is that a woman's right to
abortion, under present Supreme Court doctrine, extends to any reason the woman
might have for wishing to have an abortion, throughout the entirety of pregnancy, if
the performing physician is willing to perform the abortion.
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human being, at any or all of these stages, then the regime created in
Roe and dramatically reaffirmed in Casey creates an essentially unrestricted 5 substantive legal right of some human beings to kill-murder, really, since the power is plenary and requires no serious
justification for its exercise-other human beings, at a rate of approximately a million and a half a year. 6 On this view, Casey affirms and
embraces human genocide in the United States of a dimension exceeding, in the decade that has just past, that of the Rwandan genocide, the Nazi Holocaust, Stalin's purges, and Pol Pot's killing fields,
combined.
On any view of the holding in Casey, then, its substantive consequences for human lives are absolutely enormous-larger than that of
any Supreme Court decision ever (except perhaps Roe v. Wade, the
decision it reaffirms, which had stood for nineteen years until Casey
7
extended it for ten more, to date).
But Casey is likely to outdistance Roe in its substantive effects. For
Casey did more than merely perpetuate Roe, though that in itself
would be significant enough. Roe had been teetering in the years immediately preceding Casey. A substantial body of informed opinion
had it that the Supreme Court was ready to overrule Roe (or to continue an incremental overruling process begun three years earlier in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services") and such was a reasonable prediction at the time. Had Casey done so, it would have placed Roe's
regime on a course toward ultimate extinction, and limited the impact
of Roe's creation of a federal constitutional right to abortion to a single generation of Americans.
5 See discussion supra note 4.
6 Of course, the legal effect of the Court's abortion decisions is to say that acts
that might otherwise be deemed a species of homicide (with a degree of culpability
attached to such homicide depending on the actor's state of mind and justification)

are, as a matter of law, not homicide, but instead have the status of federal constitutional rights.

7 The Court today appears to recognize the magnitude of the stakes. As the
majority wrote in Carhart:

Millions of Americans believe that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child;
they recoil at the thought of a law that would permit it. Other millions fear

that a law that forbids abortion would condemn many American women to
lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty and leading those with

least resources to undergo illegal abortions with the attendant risks of death
and suffering.
U.S. at 920.

Carhart,530

8

492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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Casey, of course, went the other way: it reaffirmed the right to
abortion. In doing so, Casey did not merely perpetuate Roe but entrenched it, or at least purported to do so. That consequence-especially because it was so dramatic, somewhat unexpected, and marked
the end (at least for the time being) of what had been a serious and
increasingly effective political and legal campaign to overrule Roe-is
what makes Casey likely of more enduring significance than Roe.
Nor is it merely the fact of entrenching abortion rights, but the
mannerin which the Casey Court did so, that is significant. The Court
did not hold that, upon further review, Roe was right after all. Rather,
the doctrinal holding of the Court in Casey was that Roe must be adhered to "whether or not mistaken"' in its constitutional analysis, because of the judicial doctrine of stare decisis-a doctrine which,
though implicit in many of the Court's cases throughout its history
and discussed a great many times in a great many opinions, had never
been given comprehensive, systematic, and (supposedly) definitive development, until Planned Parenthood v. Casey."' This is somewhat remarkable: a Supreme Court that has been in business since 1789 had
not until 1992-over two centuries later-set forth a general theory of
the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication. The setting forth
of an ostensibly comprehensive theory of stare decisis, as a judicial
governing principle of prospective force, and advanced as one of the
most important features-perhaps the singular feature---of the rule of
law, is a major, major jurisprudential development. It is the singular
feature in the jurisprudence of Casey because without it, the Court
seemed to have suggested, the decision would have gone the other
11
way.
9 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
10 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey ?, 109 YALE LJ. 1535 (2000).
11 Id.at 1537 & n.5 (discussing language of the Casey opinion supporting this
view). The Joint Opinion in Case, strongly implies that at least some of the Justices
forming the majority would not have thought Roe correct as an original matter, and
that the result in Casey is largely explainable on the basis of the doctrine of stare
decisis. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861 ("Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis,
then, and subject to the considerations on which it customarily turns, the stronger
argument is for affirming Roe's central holding, with whatever degree of personal
reluctance any of LIs may have, not for overruling it."); id. at 858 ("Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that error would go only to the
strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by the
Constitution to the woman's liberty."); id. at 869 ("A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding tinder the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was,
at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and
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Extending that thought, the Court stated that adherence to that
doctrine of stare decisis was especially important because of the implications of non-adherence to prior precedent for perceived judicial legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and, thus, for the Court's power-a
power the Court deemed to be a power "to speak before all others" in
the name of the Constitution.1 2 Precisely because the Court had
placed so much of its own prestige at stake in Roe, it was uniquely
important to stick with the decision, according to the Court that de14
cided Casey.' 3 In other words, the error in Roe, " if error there was,"'
was of such a magnitude-so large, so consequential, so dramaticthat the Court's concern with the maintenance of its own judicial
power and with public perceptions of the Court's legitimacy and prestige required it to stick with what it had once decided, "whether or not
mistaken,"'15 and irrespective of any other consequences.
These are dramatic, important assertions at a doctrinal level, for
all of constitutional law. Not only for its effect on abortion is the case
significant (though that would be quite enough, in terms of the significance of the right it entrenches). Casey, taken seriously on its own
terms-and subsequent decisions and actions of the Court show that
it must be so taken-establishes a comprehensive doctrine of stare
decisis giving (or purporting to give) the Court's own decisions more
authoritative weight than the Constitution itself. It establishes this
doctrine in part as an instrumental necessity, in the Court's view, for
preserving the institutional supremacy of the Supreme Court with respect to the Constitution and in relation to all other constitutional
to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to
the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today.").
12 Casey, 505 U.S. at 868; see also id. at 865 (speaking of "[t] he root of American
governmental power" as being revealed "most clearly in the instance of the power
conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and specifically
upon this Court," which in turn rests on the Court's "legitimacy" as derived from
public perceptions of its fitness "to determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demauids"); id. at 868 (speaking of the American people's "belief in
themselves" as a Nation governed by "the rule of law" as being "not readily separable"
from the Court's authority and legitimacy). The Court has said things like this
before. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (asserting that the
Court must act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ('[1]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution."); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting
that the Court is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
13 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (referring to Roe as being an instance of the Court's
having "staked its authority in the first instance" such that overruling such a "watershed decision" would "subvert the Court's legitimacy").
14 Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 857.
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actors and interpreters. The past ten years have seen an enormous
number of decisions of the Court displaying a kind of triumphalismsome might call it arrogance-over the organs of elected representative government. The Court has rarely in its history been so cavalier,
so confident, so cocky, and so prolific in striking down legislative
acts. I"
In light of all this, the other doctrinally significant aspect of
Casey-and the case is hugely significant on this score as well-seems
almost ordinary: Casey reaffirmed, extended, and supplied a theoretical defense ofjudicial activism in the discovery of textually unspecified
"substantive due process" legal rights of individuals against democratic
governance, one of the most enduringly controversial and recurrent
notions in our nation's constitutional history. That is no small matter.
But it is a tribute to the significance of Casey's other effects and legal
propositions that its analysis with respect to "substantive due process"
is not even the second-or third-most important feature of the opinion.17 At every level, then, the case is significant-its effects, its methodology, its doctrine, its conception of the judicial role and ofjudicial
authority, and its conception of what constitutes the rule of law. The
decision in Casey came in the 203rd year of the Supreme Court's existence and is undoubtedly one of the most important decisions the
Court has rendered in that two-century-plus history, easily outdis16 See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). See, for example, Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (striking down damages relief against state agencies
under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(striking down Nebraska statute banning partial birth abortion); Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (striking down federal statute prescribing a multi-factor
"volntariness" standard for determining the admissibility of confessions in federal
criminal proceedings); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down
the Violence Against Women Act as being in excess of Congress's legislative powers
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (striking down damages relief tnder the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied against the states); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (striking down provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied against
states); and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as being in excess of Congress's legislative power Under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment). Need I go on? Listing recent aggressive
exercises of judicial power vis-A-vis Congress and state legislattres has become a routine feature of recent academic literature criticizing the Court, with the content of the
list varying somewhat to reflect the scholar's sense of which judicial invalidations of
statitory enactments were "bad."
17 The Court revised its substantive due process methodology yet again, just five
years after Casey, in Washington v. Cluck.sberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). See Paulsen, supra
note 10, at 1557-60.
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tancing some of the most important-seeming "landmarks" of earlier

eras.

The reader may have detected-should have inferred-from the
above discussion, if not from the title of this tenth-year retrospective
Article, that Casey's huge significance cannot come without a huge
judgment attached to it. For at every level at which the case is hugely
significant, it is hugely and horribly wrong. It is so wrong, in fact, that
despite our closeness to it in time, and the lack of detachment this
necessarily brings, it is possible to compare Casey's wrongness with the
wrongness of some of the Court's most magnificently wrong decisions
in its history, and make a stunning, depressing declaration: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey is the worst constitutional decision of the United
States Supreme Court of all time.
And that is saying quite a lot. The U.S. Supreme Court has committed more than its fair share of judicial atrocities over the past 210
years: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 8 Plessy v. Ferguson,9 Korematsu v. United
States,21 1 Prigg v. Pennsylvania,2 1 Lochner v. New York, 22 Roe v. Wade,2 3

and Stenberg v. Carhar 24 (the latter two cases being closely related to
Casey) are among the many obvious rivals for the title of worst constitutional decision of all time. The list is so long, so infamous, and so
disturbingly regular-recurring consistently over time-that one must
seriously question whether the Supreme Court has been, on balance,
a positive or negative force in our nation's constitutional history. Yet
of all the bad things that the Supreme Court has done in its history,
PlannedParenthood v. Casey. is the worst. Casey is Public Enemy Number One on the list of the Supreme Court's crimes against the Constitution and against humanity.
In this Article on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the
Casey decision, I will defend my choice of Casey as the worst of the
worst constitutional atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Part I sets forth my criteria for what makes a constitutional decision
"bad." Part II explains why this makes Casey "The Worst"-worse,
even, than its nearest rivals, Dred Scott v. Sandford, Roe v. Wade, and
Stenberg v. Carhart. Finally, Part III ventures some concluding observations about the implications of all this for judicial authority generally,
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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for our faith in the courts as instruments of the rule of law and the
protection of justice, and for our confidence in the progress of humankind and in our ability to learn from the atrocities and injustices
of history.
A disclaimer and word of explanation: I do not pretend to.be
detached, neutral or objective. My conclusions are neither cheerful
nor comfortable, and I do not intend them to be. I believe Casey is an
atrocity, and I will defend that position passionately and uncompromisingly. I am very much a partisan on this constitutional issue, which
I believe to be the most important legal issue of our time-the defining constitutional controversy of our age and one that affects all other
aspects of our jurisprudence, much as slavery was the defining constitutional issue of nineteenth-century America.
But I am not a partisan on this constitutional issue without good
reasons. This Article will set forth those reasons, and the reader is
invited to evaluate them. I do not intend or expect that this Article
will persuade partisans on the other side. In fact, I would expect that
most such persons are no longer reading this. Nor is it designed to
persuade the unconvinced (if there are such people), in the sense of
changing their convictions with respect to abortion, either as a constitutional or a moral matter. Rather, it is designed to prod the middle
(and tepid opponents of Roe) out of what I suspect is more likely complacency, indifference, or quiescence than lack of belief with respect
to Roe, Casey and abortion, by advancing a strong view of the constitutional and moral stakes of such complacency. For if it is really the case
that Casey is the worst constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of
all time, then that is something about which we ought not be complacent, indifferent, or quiescent. If we are, that tells us something about
our moral character, and about how we as individuals may have reacted to the atrocious injustices of the past had we been present at
their infliction-injustices that we all today condemn, and which we
are undeservedly confident (from the comfortable distance of decades
or centuries later) we would have condemned had we been around at
the time.
The point of this Article is to stake the claim that we are
presented with precisely such an atrocity today-one that, like some
in our past, has been perpetrated in the name of the Constitutionand to challenge the timidity of our reaction to it. Are "We the People" of the United States, living in the twenty-first century, able and
willing to identify and respond to gross moral atrocities and betrayals
of our Constitution when they are staring us in the face?
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How does one measure just how "bad" a particular U.S. Supreme
Court decision is? One person's atrocity might be another's most
cherished gem, if there are no generally accepted legal or moral criteria forjudging constitutional decisions. The eye of the beholder is left
to judge for itself on the basis of personal preference. This problem
plagues all of constitutional law today. There is no general agreement
on standards or interpretive method in constitutional law scholarship.
Indeed, one common position is that there can be no agreement on
standards or interpretive method. This Article cannot begin to remedy that discouraging situation, but I can at least make clear my own
premises and the criteria that yield my conclusions.
I submit that a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court is
"bad" to the degree it misconstrues the Constitution and such misconstruction produces harmful or evil results. By "misconstruction," I
mean that a decision reaches a result not fairly attributable to a rule of
law supplied by the text, structure, and history of the Constitution.25
By "harmful or evil results" I mean what most people mean when they
refer to "bad" things: a decision is harmful or evil when it imposes on
innocent people death, oppression, deprivation of fundamental
25 Obviously, the question of what constitutes a "misconstruction" of the Constitution begs its own set of questions, requiring its own subset of interpretive criteria for
faithful constitutional interpretation and generating its own (nearly infinite) sub-debate over these criteria. Once again, I can only state (and very briefly defend) my
criteria here, as the debate over interpretive method has generated its own volumi-

nous commentary. I submit that a judicial decision more faithfully interprets the
Constitution to the extent that its result can be directly and fairly attributable to a rule
or standard stated with reasonable precision in the actual written, enacted language
of the Constitution, as those words would have been understood by an ordinary
speaker or reader of the English language at the time the provision at issue was
adopted; to the extent that such a decision is fairly traceable to a sound deductive
inference from the overall structure and logic of the text, and analogic reasoning

from its other provisions; and to the extent such a decision accords with historical
evidence of the received understanding of the text and the intentions of its drafters
and adopters. These criteria for faithful constitutional interpretation constitute, in
approximately that order, a hierarchy of criteria for faithfulness in constitutional construction. The less well that a judicial decision can be justified tnder these interpretive criteria-the more it strains, bends, ignores, or mutilates constitutional text,
structure, and history-the more it can be said to constitute a misconstruction or

erroneous interpretation of the Constitution. For a comprehensive statement of (and
defense of) an interpretive methodology of original public meaning textualism, see
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution'sSecret

Drafting History, 91 CEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Kesavan & Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force]; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia

Unconstitutional?,90 CAL. L. REX. 291, 396-99 (2002).
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human rights, deprivation of liberty, misery, discrimination, or indignity (in roughly descending order of importance).
Those are my two core criteria: serious misinterpretation-clearly
legally wrong conclusions-and serious harm resulting from that misinterpretation. Both are essential elements of a bad judicial decision.
Decisions that misconstrue the Constitution but that are of no enduring harmful consequence (or, it perhaps may be better to say, that are
of little direct consequence, other than the fact that they are bad examples or that they may tend to generate further misconstructions of
more harmful consequence), or that actually produce outcomes
broadly recognized as good (i.e., saving lives, stopping injustice, relieving misery, etc.) are hard to nominate as among the very worst decisions of the Court. Conversely, a sound interpretation of the
Constitution that produces a harmful outcome may not be worthy of
two cheers, but the blame for the harm can hardly be laid at the feet
of a Court that has faithfully applied the Constitution. Our Constitution permits or tolerates a number of harmful or evil results, if the
choices of democratically selected representatives of the people yield
those results. A judicial decision holding as much cannot fairly be
blamed for the evil. The evil is, rather, the fault of an insufficiently
just Constitution, or of insufficiently faithful representatives, or of an
insufficiently virtuous people. There is probably very little evil that
our Constitution actually requires (now that slavery has been abolished).2' There is a great deal of potential evil that the Constitution
27
permits, but that is a different type of problem.
26 The Fugitive Slave Clause, U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2, reinforced by other constitutional provisions accommodating and protecting slavery, see, e.g., id. art. 1, § 2
("Three-Fifths Clause," providing, for purposes of representation, that each slave
counts as 3/5 of a person); id. art. 1,§ 9 (Slave Importation Clause, prohibiting Congress from banning importation of slaves until 1808); id. art. V (Slavery Amendment

Proviso, prohibiting amendment to 1st or 4th clauses of Article I, section 9 before
1808), produced substantively evil results that were mandated by the Constitution, in
the form of legal assistance to private violence and oppression.
27 When (if ever) is a judge (or anyone else) justified in acting against the law, in
the name of "justice"? For a discussion of what a judge should do when confronted

with a duty faithfully to apply law, the honest application of which will result in a grave
substantive evil, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUsTICE AccUSED: ANTISIAVERY AND THE JUDI'IAL PROCESS (1975). For my review of Cover's magnificent book, and my answers to
these questions, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing justice: Some Variations on the
Themes of Robert M. CoversJustice Accused, 7J.L. & RELIGION 33 (1989).
One could argue, I suppose, that a decision "misconstrues" the Constitution,
thereby producing evil results, whenever it declines so to "construe" the Constitution as
to avoid those results. Such a view, however, requires at bottom a hermeneutic in
which the words of the Constitution are essentially irrelevant. The Constitution,
properly interpreted (on such a view), forbids all seriously unjust outcomes.
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I am addressing something more specific. If a judicial decision is
both wrong-itself against the law-and harmful, the blame rests
squarely with the Court that decided it. In such a case, the Court has
been faithless to the Constitution, and the individual Justices faithless
to their oaths, and in so doing produced harmful or evil results. That
is the category of cases with which I am centrally concerned.
Building upon the core criteria of misinterpretation and resulting harm, if a judicial misconstruction is intentional-ifit is knowing
and deliberate in its misinterpretation of the Constitution and in its
production of harmful or evil results-that makes the decision particularly egregious. Error is bad, but a deliberate breach of faith seems
even worse. As the saying goes, even a dog knows the difference between being tripped over and being kicked. The criminal law distinguishes degrees of culpability based on the perpetrator's intention to
cause specific or general harm, or intention to do a certain act, knowing what the consequences of that act are. If the Court is able to appreciate the nature and consequences of its own voluntary acts, and
deliberately embraces an unjustifiable interpretation of the Constitution and the harmful consequences it entails, its decision is all the
more atrocious. If the evil results of a judicial decision are clearly
known and understood in advance, it becomes correspondingly hard
to absolve the judge or judges of guilt and responsibility for a knowing, conscious, willful, and harmful misinterpretation of the
Constitution.
Still more, I submit that a decision of such a type is especially bad
if it also tends to generate further misinterpretations, resulting in further evils. Our legal system tends to value precedent, magnifying and
proliferating the errors that result from earlier errors and the evils
that result from earlier evils. 28 Not all such wrong, harmful decisions
Whatever the attractions of such a hermeneutic, I set it to one side as not consistent
with the idea of written constitutionalism. A written constitution that permits (or
compels) bad results might be a bad constitution; there may be valid moral arguments
for resistance to such a constitutional regime; and those arguments might even yield a
conclusion thatjudges morally should resist the regime (even though they swore alle-

giance to it) through the guise of interpretation. But this is a separate set of issues. I
am assuming that the written Constitution imposes limitations on what fairly can be

called "interpretation" or "construction" of that written Constitution, and that ajudicial decision that operates within those limitations cannot itself be blamed for the
resulting harms of faithful constitutional interpretation.

28 1 have criticized strong conceptions of stare decisis in earlier writing. See Paulsen, supra note 10; Michael Stokes Paulsen, CaptainJames 7. Kirk and the Enterprise of
ConstitutionalInterpretation:Some Modest Proposalsfrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 671, 678-81 (1995); Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown, CaseyStyle: The Shocking First Draft of the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1287 (1994).
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have such strong generative effects; they may be tightly limited to
their facts, or involve highly idiosyncratic or unusual situations. Some
clear errors have not endured long, having been reversed or limited
by subsequent court decisions or constitutional amendments, with the
harm of the decision thereby being limited to the brief period during
which the error was alive.2' ' But to the extent an un-reversed, erroneous, harmful decision is broadly cast and prospectively "legislative" in
its rule of decision, or adopts an especially sweeping principle concerning the decision's own generative consequences (or the generative consequences ofjudicial decisions generally, independent of their
correctness), a bad judicial decision is all the more bad."
Is there anything flawed in these criteria? One might nibble
around the edges of the definitions in order to tilt them away from
certain conclusions. And one might disagree with how these criteria
should be applied, and how particular decisions should be judged according to these standards. But in principle it is hard to deny that a
constitutional decision by the Supreme Court is "bad" precisely to the
degree it: (1) misinterprets the Constitution (that is, is unfaithful to
the text, structure, and historical meaning of the provisions at issue);
(2) thereby producing unjustifiable death, oppression, denial of liberty, human misery, discrimination, or indignity; (3) does so intentionally; and (4) does so in such a manner as to tend to generate
further such results. I must confess that these criteria seem to me so
obvious, so unassailable, and leave so little room for disagreement,
except perhaps for matters of emphasis, that it is hard to imagine a
reasonable argument to which to direct an anticipatory rebuttal. A
constitutionaldecision of the U.S. Supreme Court is "bad" to the degree it misconstrues the Constitution and such a misconstruction produces harmful or
evil results.
But the fact remains that precedent is highly influential in our Anglo-American legal
regime, and that judicial decisions have a substantial generative, quasi-legislative prospective force with respect to subsequent decisions.

29

There are many possible illustrations of this. just to pick one of my personal

favorites, compare Minersville School Distict v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding
expulsion of Jehovah's Witnesses fiom public school for refusal to perform compulsory flag salute, and rejecting Free Exercise Clause claim), with West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down compuls6ry flag
salute as violation of the Free Speech Clause).
30 The Civil War and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments "reversed"
Dred Scott after a relatively short period of time, but (as I argue below) that reversal
itself came at great cost in human life and human suffering, such that the short duration is hardly a fact in mitigation of' Dred Scott's evil. But at least Dred Scott is no longer
good law; it failed to generate ongoing legal consequences over the long term.
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The real question is how these criteria apply to decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court. Under these criteria, many of the Court's constitutional decisions have been bad. But of the bad, which ones are truly
the worst? The hunt is for error; for egregious error; for evil egregious
error; and for (the worst of the worst) intentional, evil, egregious error.
II.

APPL.ICATION

What's wrong with Casey, under these criteria? Plenty. It perhaps
makes most sense to start with what was wrong with Roe, and go from
there, for one interesting question is what makes Casey genuinely
worse than Roe to someone who finds both decisions wrong on the
merits.
The result in Roe v., Wade was, to put the matter simply and directly, not warranted by any plausible argument from constitutional
text, structure, or history. I begin with the obvious: Roe is utterly indefensible as a matter of constitutional text. The suggestion that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ("[n]o state
shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law . . ."3) actually entails an affirmative right to abortion,
immune from government restriction, is hard to take seriously as a
matter of constitutional language or of the original understanding of
its drafters or ratifiers. In fact, I know of no serious scholar, judge, or
lawyer who attempts to defend Roe's analysis on textual or historical
grounds. A first-year law student who argued for such a position
would likely get a "C-" in any good Constitutional Law course, and
that's only because of grade inflation.
Professor John Hart Ely said it well in his Yale Law Journalcomment shortly following the case:
What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is
not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers'
thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value
derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure .... At times the inferences the Court has drawn
from the values the Constitution marks for special protection have
been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an
3:
obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking.

Roe is pure judicial lawmaking. It is not merely an unjustified
stretching of the language of the text; its result is wholly outside the
range of plausible readings of the text. Indeed, it is not unfair to say
31 U.S. CONSTr. amend. XIV, § 1.
32 John Hart Ely, The Wages of COying Wolf. A Coninent on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 935-37 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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that the Court's decision is not even constitutional interpretationat all.
The Courtjust plain made up an abortion regulation fiber-statute, not
even working very hard to disguise the fact. The result, with the elaborate three-stage trimester division, even looks like a statute. The result
is a pure judicial ukase. It is anti-democratic and fundamentally anticonstitutional to a degree rivaled by very few, if any, important constitutional decisions in our nation's history. As a matter of constitutional
interpretation, Roe is an embarrassment-perhaps the worst workproduct the Court has ever produced.
To be sure, Roe has its defenders in terms of the Court's result;
many law professors and activists like legal abortion on demand-unfettered private "choice." But I cannot recall ever seeing a serious
scholarly defense of Roe's legal reasoning, on its own terms, by a distinguished legal academic (or even by an undistinguished one). 3
Where the decision is defended, it is on grounds of "natural law" reasoning frankly divorced from any reliance on the written text,3 4 or on
33 Laurence Tribe's defense of Roe, shortly after the decision, comes as close as
any to defending the decision on "due process"-ish terms. Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process (?f Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1973). But Tribe's 1973 theory is not at all identical to the Court's. Roe essentially
announced a substantive right-an immtnity from governmental regulation-ostensibly flowing from the Due Process Clause. Tribe's "model" was less explicitly substantive due process but argued instead that Roe could be defended in terms of
"alternative allocations of decisionmaking authority" with respect to certain types of
choices. It is not clear that this is much different in effect from the Court's theory,
but it falls well short of defending Roe on its own terms.
34 See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Do We Have (n Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rrv.
703, 707 (1975). A standard variant of the natural law argument that attempts to tie
such reasoning to actual constitutional language is the idea that the Ninth Amendment autlorizes judicial discovery (or creation) of substantive constitutional rights
not specified in any other provision of the text. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CtI. L. REV. 1127 (1987). This is surely a more plausible
nominee than the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which appears
rather plainly to be about procedure and not substance), but not all that much more
plausible. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t] he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. On its face, the amendment plainly does not create
any rights. It is a rile of construction ("shall not be construed") about the effect of
the enumeration of other rights. Specifically, the enumeration does not displace
("deny or disparage") other rights; it does not "pre-empt" the field. The historical
context makes this doubly clear: the Federalists had expressed concern that an enumeration of rights might be misconstrted as assigning all such rights to the domain of
the national government. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). But a federal constitutional rule of non-preemption
clearly does not create or authorize future judicial creation of new federal law constitutional rights. It merely leaves unaffected existing state law, common law, and natu-
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the basis of arguments very loosely extrapolated from the Equal Protection Clause concerning gender and feminism, -5 or, most recently
ral law understandings. It neither constitutionalizes such understandings-that is,
makes them a part of the body of federal constitutional rights-nor upsets them. It
does nothing.
It is therefore theoretically possible that state constitutional law, state common
law, or a state's understanding of natural law, creates a right to abortion. If those
positive law sources or natural law understandings create legal rights aside from those
created or recognized by the U.S. Constitution, those rights are retained. But they do
not have federal constitutional law status. They have whatever status their source confers on them. In the Framers' world, for example, natural law principles were
subordinate to enacted, positive law. See generally Paulsen, supra note 27 (collecting
and discussing authorities). In most modern abortion cases, a challenge is being
made to an enacted state law, on the ground that it is contrary to the federal Constitution. The Ninth Amendment cannot fairly and honestly be used in support of any
such claim.
Natural law principles certainly can supply a powerful and important critique of
positive, enacted law. See id. at 41-44 (collecting sources). Positive law that violates
("correct") principles of natural law is usually bad in the sense of producing wrong
substantive outcomes-quite possibly including some of the evils I described above in
discussing criteria for what makes a "bad" constitutional decision (i.e., death, oppression, injustice, etc.). I will address the relevance of "natural law" to the matter of
abortion below, in discussing whether or not the abortion right created in Roe and

reaffirmed in Casey is "good" or "bad." See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
35 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe is weakened by its failure to base the right to abortion on gender equality); Sylvia

A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 963 (1984) (arguing
that abortion regulations should be analyzed with respect to sex equality, and proposing a "unified approach to sex equality" that would take biological differences between men and women into account when appropriate); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (arguing that
regulations prohibiting or limiting women's right to reproductive control are better
analyzed under a sex equality principle than under a privacy principle, because the
"private is a distinctive sphere of women's inequality to men"); cf David A. Strauss,
Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1993) (suggesting that
the conflict between fetal life and the effect of abortion regulation on women's status
should be central to the legal debate over abortion).
The "Equal Protection" arguments purport to be derived from constitutional
text, but with scarcely more connection to the language and meaning of the text than
the arguments purporting to flow from the "Due Process of Law" clause. They are,

like the Due Process Clause arguments in Roe (and in Dred Scott, as I discuss presently), essentially policy-driven arguments that make nominal reference to the text,
not truly text-based arguments. Abortion restrictions do not impose legal burdens on
the basis of gender, but on the basis of the asserted presence and value of a human
life in utero. To be sure, only women become pregnant. But an abortion restriction's
target category-pregnancies (or some subset thereof) -embraces all relevant instances of the identified harm that the restriction seeks to prevent. It is tightly drawn
to its purpose of protecting the human life in utero (to some degree or another); it
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does not regulate women as a class; it regulates the conduct of men and women relevant to commission of or assistance in abortion; and it affects no women who are not
pregnant. See generally Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,
267-74 (1993) (holding that plaintiffs failed to show the class-based discriminatory
animus necessary to form a colorable claim of conspiracy to deprive women seeking
abortions of their right to interstate travel because opposition to abortion does not
discriminate against women, but merely those women seeking abortions); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 & n.20 (1974) (upholding California's exclusion of disabilities resulting from normal childbirth from its disability insurance system because
pregnancy, as well as the ability to become pregnant, is a real difference between men
and women, and thus does not violate equal protection); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (reasoning that the application of a facially neutral policy or
statue that has a disparate impact on a minority group is not violative of equal protection, unless the policy is motivated by an "invidious discriminatory purpose"). But cf
UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that a policy excluding
women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs violated Title VII by creating a facial gender-based classification and explicitly discriminating against women on
the basis of their sex). This is all quite aside from the question of whether, assuming
the classification was one properly subject to some measure of Equal Protection review of a classification that creates disparate treatment of fundamentally similar things
(i.e., disparate treatment of men and women with respect to abortion), there nonetheless exists a sufficiently compelling (or "important") state interest in protecting
embryonic and fetal human life.
The Equal Protection/feminist-theory arguments are, in the end, less text-based
or doctrine-based than "justice"-based. They are substantiveclaims that it is harmful,or
unjust, or oppressive, in some way, to those women who become pregnant, to deny
them an escape from the normal or natural consequences of pregnancy through the
route of abortion. These arguments are, at bottom, arguments for a non-comparative
substantive-justice right of autonomy, not arguments for a comparative-justice right to
equal treatment. Abortion restrictions may limit the freedom of action of pregnant
women (and, indirectly, their spouses or boyfriends). But they simply do not treat
things that are alike in an unlike way or unlike things as if they were alike; nor do they
inevitably mask a discriminatory animus for disparate treatment unrelated to any genuine objective.
"Equal Protection"/feminist-theory, substantive-justice or autonomy arguments for
legal abortion have fascinating implications for present abortion law doctrine. For
example, how is a substantive-justice claim, based on the asserted harmful or unjust or
oppressive consequences of an abortion restriction on pregnant women, affected by
the reasons for which an abortion is sought? Is the right lost where there is an especially unsympathetic or callous motivation for its exercise, such as abortion for pure
economic or social convenience, or for gender selection of born children, or to spite
a former boyfriend or husband? Do harm/injustice/oppression justifications thus
suggest a narrower abortion right, limited to circumstances of need to avoid genuine
harm to the pregnant woman and inapposite (or forfeited) where such a claim is not
plausible? Surely the practice of sex-selective abortion turns substantive-justice gender/feminist arguments back on themselves. Similarly, if the abortion right is predicated on claims of harm and oppression to pregnant women, does the voluntariness
of the woman's conduct in becoming pregnant become relevant to the existence or
scope of the right? Finally, how is the autonomy argument affected by substantive-
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and fashionably, on the basis not of the correctness of the decision at
the time rendered but on the status the decision has obtained as a
function either of the doctrine of stare decisis (the argument of Casey)
or some notion that the Constitution operates more like a set of evolving common law principles than as an authoritative written legal
text36-a point I take up presently.3 7 But no one seriously defends
Roe as a fair and plausible exposition and application of the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe's reasoning is utterly laughable, a running joke in constitutional law
circles.
The substantive due process reasoning of Roe most nearly resembles, of any historical precedent, the substantive due process reasoning of Dred Scott v. Sandford,3 8 Roe's doctrinal great-grandfather. Dred
Scott, of course, is on everyone's all-time hit list of most atrocious constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court. And for good reason: in
Dred Scott, the Court misconstrued the Constitution egregiously and,
to all appearances, willfully, producing a bizarre, monstrously unjust,
and politically destructive outcome. The case surely must be regarded
as the principal rival to Roe and Casey for worst constitutional decision
of all time. Yet the features of Dred Scott that make it such an infamous
judicial atrocity furnish an instructive basis for comparison with the
Court's abortion decisions over a century later, making Dred Scott
worth an extended detour.
Much like Roe, the Court's legal conclusions in Dred Scott are utterly indefensible as a matter of the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution. The two major holdings of Dred Scott make no sense, are
justice arguments on behalf of the humanity of the fetus (quite apart from whether a
human fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment)?
The Equal Protection/gender/feminist/substantive-justice argument for abortion raises fascinating issues that I will leave for another day. My simple point here is
that those arguments have precious little to do with the Constitution's text, structure,
or history and, as such, are less aptly classified as constitutional arguments than as
policy arguments dressed in quasi-constitutional clothing. They are not arguments

about the meaning of the words and phrases of an authoritative constitutional text,
taken in linguistic and historical context. They are policy arguments for a desired
outcome.
36 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L.
REx,. 877, 934 (1996) (suggesting that American constitutional interpretation has

taken on the characteristics of a common law system and approving this approach
given that the "Constitution is much more, and much richer, than the written
document").

37

See infi-a notes 77-103 and accompanying text.

38

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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arguably unnecessary to the outcome 3 9 and are difficult to explain as
anything other than deliberate efforts gratuitously to award as many
issues as possible to the pro-slavery position. First, the Court held that
blacks, even free blacks, were not and could never be "citizens" of the'
United States within the meaning of the Constitution 4 1 (the Court
purporting to interpret, of all things, the grant of diversity of state
citizenship jurisdiction to federal courts in Article III of the Constitution). 4' As so many have noted so many times (beginning with the
dissenters in the case 42 ), the citizenship holding was thoroughly atextual, ahistorical, and illogical, assuming its own conclusion as the racist premise for its analysis. The second holding, invalidating the
power of Congress to regulate or restrict slavery in the territories, 43 is
methodologically, and morally, even worse. The Court found in the
Due Process Clause (of the Fifth Amendment) an inviolable constitutional right to own slaves as property, immune from national government interference even in the territories of the Nation, 44 even

assuming Congress otherwise had legislative power to regulate or prohibit the institution of slavery in federal territories (which the Court,
incredibly, also denied to be the case):
[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress
which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed

39 Several historians and legal commentators have noted the existence of plausible legal theories that would have supported a holding against Dred Scott's claim to
freedom and that would have broken no new ground. The simplest disposition of the

case would have been that, in a suit in federal court in Missouri, Missouri law should
govern the choice of law governing the status of a Missouri domiciliary, Scott, and that
this might legitimately lead to the application of Missouri law, not Illinois law or the
Missouri Compromise's prohibition of slavery in federal territories, to the issue of
Scott's status as slave or free. And under Missouri law, Scott, a Missouri domiciliary
and slave, having not sued for his freedom during his sojourn in Illinois or in Wisconsin territory, remained a slave. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED Sco-rr v. SANDFORD: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITI-I DOCUMENTS

31-32 (1997).

40 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-07.
41 Id. at 405-06.
42 Id. at 393, 529-64 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564-633 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
43 Id. at 452.

44

Id. at 450-52.
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could hardly be dignified with the name
no offence against the laws,
45
of due process of law.
The most brazen, egregious misinterpretations of the law are
those that have no plausible basis in the authoritative.legal text being
interpreted and applied. But the most insidiousmisinterpretations are
those that twist, distort, or cleverly misapply sound general principles
of law. For in such cases the inclusion of seemingly correct statements
of law creates a veneer of respectability and plausibility around the
perversion. ChiefJustice Taney's Dred Scott opinion correctly observed
that the Constitution (at the time) was pro-slavery. The original document indeed recognized, accommodated, and sheltered the institution in important respects. And it is also true, as Taney argued, that
the federal government has no right to deprive an individual of any of
his constitutional rights no matter where he travels in the nation. But
it is a classic lawyer's trick-a rhetorical and analytical fraud of the
worst kind-to say that because the Constitution supports X in one
respect that it should be presumed to support X in all respects, or that
because the Constitution provides for A, B, C, and D, it logically implies E, /,and G as well. Quite the contrary, the extent to which the
Constitution defines rights and powers also limits them. The presence
in the Constitution of certain provisions in favor of slavery does not
create, through the emanations and penumbras of such provisions, a
general, super-protected federal constitutional right of citizens (defined by the Court to exclude blacks, of course) to own property in
the form of slaves. It was not the case, and never was the case, as
Taney claimed, that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution,"4 in this strong sense. The
Constitution protected slave-holders' property rights in certain respects, most notably by according them a constitutional right to recapture fugitive slaves. But the Constitution never contained a general
federal substantive constitutional right to own slaves as property.
Likewise, it is a perversion of the Fifth Amendment's protection
against deprivation of property (or liberty) "without due process of law"
to bend it into a free-floating constitutional right against substantive
government regulation affecting property in the form of slaves.
One will recognize in this discussion of Dred Scott the elements of
a similar critique of Roe: not only do Dred Scott and Roe share the same
linguistically nonsensical constitutional theory of "substantive due
process," they apply it in much the same mischievous way, extrapolating from specific provisions a new, general right. It was Griswold v.
45
46

Id. at 450.
1d. at 451.
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Connecticut,47 of

course, that first mfade "emanations" and "penumbras" household words for constitutional lawyers and scholars, and
there is probably no better exemplar of such a methodology of
manipulating specifics into generalities and back to new specifics not
supported by the constitutional text. But Roe did Griswold (and, in
this respect, Dred Scott) one better. The Court in Roe declined to be
limited even by Griswold's methodology, but simply used it as a data
point for further extrapolation. Roe invented the abortion right out of
the penumbras and emanations of past decisions that had invented new
rights out of the perceived penumbras and emanations of constitutional texts. The Court reasoned from specific prior extrapolations
(like Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird,48 and Skinner v.
Oklahoma49 ) to a general "right of privacy" and then read that principle back into the Constitution to create a right to abortion. In Roe,
there is even less pretense of a mooring in constitutional text than the
Court faked in Dred Scott. Roe is all extrapolation from precedent and
jumping back-and-forth between general and specific. Yet Roe lacks
even any serious mooring in cases like Griswold that had extrapolated
those other constitutional rights. In this respect, Roe took Dred Scott to
a whole new level. In Dred Scott, one sees judicial willfulness disguised
by the most flimsy and contrived distortion of the constitutional text
one could imagine. In Roe, one sees the constitutional text essentially
disappear entirely. Roe is judicial legislation completely cut loose
from any pretense of textual justification.5
Roe and Dred Scott share another crucial feature ofjudicial atrocity
other than atrocious reasoning: their results inflicted great harm on
innocent lives. More than simply doing violence to the Constitution,
Roe and Dred Scott authorized private violence against others, under
color of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. In the case of
Dred Scott, the evil was the extension of slavery and the invalidation of
political measures to contain it. Dred Scott essentially established a federal constitutional right to own slaves, at least as against action by the
federal government, and assured slavery's political ability to expand

47

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

48
49

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).

50

See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 ("The Constitution does not explicitly mention

any right of privacy. [B]ttt the Court has recognized ....

); id. at 153 ("The right of

privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty . . . as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the [Ninth
Amendment].
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into new areas of the nation. 5 1 In the case of Roe v. Wade, and in its
companion case Doe v. Bolton,5 2 the evil was the creation of a constitutional right to abortion, at the sole private choice of the mother, for
essentially any reason, and throughout all nine months of pregnancy. 53 Dred Scott did not create slavery, and Roe did not create abortion. In each instance, (some) states' laws had already given legal
protection to the respective practices. In each case, the practice may
have flourished even without illegitimate judicial intervention in its
favor. But in each case, Dred Scott and Roe, the Supreme Court's decision gave federal constitutional status and protection to the practice,
51 A long-running historical debate asks whether the rationale of Dred Scott presaged a possible future decision-a "second Dred Scott case," as Senate candidate Abraham Lincoln contended in 1858-that would forbid free states from absolutely
prohibiting slave ownership within their borders. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858: SPEECHES, LErERS, AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 426, 432 (Library of America ed. 1989); see
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN

206-09 (1995);JAMES M.

MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY

176-89 (1988). A New York case in litigation at the
time presented the question of whether the Constitution forbade New York law from
making slaves free when voluntarily brought into the state by their masters, temporarily, while in transit from one slave state to another. (A Virginia family was traveling
to Texas, ironically, by way of boat to New York to catch a boat to New Orleans.) See
Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860) (4-3 decision) (rejecting federal constitutional challenges predicated on the Privileges and Immunities and Full Faith and
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA

Credit Clauses of Article IV, and on the Commerce Clause as an implied prohibition
of state laws impairing commerce). The case never came before the Supreme Court
because of the intervention of the Civil War.
The short answer is that there is no way to be sure what the Taney Court might
have done had Lemmon come before it. Strictly speaking, the "reasoning" of Dred Scott
does not resolve the issues in Lemmon. Dred Scott held that Congress lacked power to
prohibit slavery in the Territories, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment (which applied only to actions of the federal government, see Barron v.
City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)), prohibited federal government interference with the right to own slaves. Nonetheless, language in Dred Scott implies (however absurdly) that the Constitution creates a general right of citizens to own slaves. It
was certainly not inconceivable that the same Court that could decide Dred Scott the
way it did could extend its reasoning to conclude (however illogically) that the Light
to own slaves was likewise one of those "privileges and immunities" of citizens that
another state could not deny to such citizens when present (temporarily? permanently?) within their borders.
52 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
53 As noted above, Doe v. Bolton was, and remains, extremely significant for its
constitutional definition of "health" for purposes of applying Roe's required "life or
health" exception to state laws prohibiting or limiting abortions even after the unborn child would be able to live outside of his or her mother's womb. See supra note
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authorizing as a matter of federal constitutional law-and, perhaps,
thereby implicitly validating as a moral proposition 5 4 -dramatically increased private violence against third parties.
Which one is worse? We are in the strange land, now, of comparing seemingly incommensurable atrocities: private violence in the
form of slavery and private violence in the form of abortion, each with
fundamentally illegitimate judicial endorsement and protection. 55 To
choose either is not to disparage the other. But if it is a horrible thing
for one human to enslave another, with the backing of law, it surely is
even worse for one human to kill another, with the backing of law. If
the human life in utero is accorded the moral status of a human being,
then an asserted plenary constitutional legal right of one person to
abort the life of another person is the worst moral evil ever to be sanctioned in American law-worse than slavery, worse than internment
on racial grounds, 5" worse than anything else in the history of American law.
That leads to the most important question in the abortion debate. Is the unborn human embryo or fetus entitled to the moral
worth of a human being, such that his or her intentional killing by
another should be regarded as a moral evil or moral wrong? That is
the heart of the entire abortion issue. The question can be broken
down into further components: first, is the human embryo or fetus
human life? Second, is the human embryo or fetus human life deserving of treatment as such?
The first question is easy. A conceived human embryo is, biologically, human life. There can be no serious question about this. The
full genetic makeup of a unique human being is present at conception, and that makeup constitutes a human life, shortly thereafter recognizable as such. There is no room for disagreement with the
54 For better or worse, the law is sometimes a pedagogue. On the possible role of
Supreme Court decisions in forming popular views of right and wrong, see infra Part
Ill.
55 It was sometimes argued, at the time, that slavery was a benign arrangement.
But it lakes little reflection to recognize that coercive slavery must ultimately be
backed by force, and the force that the law sanctioned was often violent in the extreme. For a gripping example, see State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829) (upholding plenary power of master to beat and even kill a slave, in order to vindicate the
complete power of the master over the servant). it is equally clear that abortion is an
act of private violence against another: abortion kills the human fetus. The only question posed by the debate over abortion is whether the fetus has moral status, such that
violence against it is regarded as a moral wrong. I address that issue presently. See
infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.

56 The Supreme Court's decision upholding the infamous internment of Japanese-Americans during World War 11is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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scientific and medical evidence concerning the biological beginning
of human life. The human embryo is a new, distinct human life. It is
clearly life, and it is clearly human life. As I have written elsewhere:
The life form is not that of a cow, or an amoeba, or a cancer cell. If
implanted in the wall of the uterus and allowed to develop naturally
thereafter (and absent a medical problem), this human life will very
quickly-within a matter of weeks-grow into the recognizable
form of a human baby. After conception and implantation, the process is one of human development along a continuum, greater in
degree but little different in principle from human development
that continues in the infant after birth. There is no principled line
to be drawn between conception and birth, in terms of the question
whether the biological being is human life (as opposed to the question whether that being is capable of survival independent of his or
her mother). Biologically speaking, the human fetus is not "potential" human life, but actual human life whose potential for growth
57
and development has not yet been realized.
To claim that the pre-born human embryo is not human life is,
from a scientific and medical standpoint, simply absurd. No serious
physician or biologist would hold such a view. To so claim is either an
act of ignorance or one of willful intellectual dishonesty.
In fact, few who argue for legal abortion rest their case on such a
factually untenable position. Instead, the claim is that the human embryo or fetus is not morally entitled to be treated as a human being,
for purposes of being protected from the private violence of othersor, at least, not fully entitled to such protection, depending on the
stage of development. 58 The moral judgment of pro-choice advocates
is that unborn human life is, at some or all stages of gestation, not
morally worthy of protection against private violence. This formulation of the proposition may sound harsh, but I think it is a fair and
dispassionate statement of the pro-choice moral position: essentially
everyone who defends abortion does so, in substantial part, on the
ground that the fetus, while "human life" in some technical biological
sense, has no or very limited moral entitlement to be treated as
human life comparable to born human beings, or that such moral
entitlement fluctuates along a sliding.scale with the stage of development of the fetus. At some or all points along this continuum, the
human embryo or fetus is "so far inferior" in human qualities to born
57

Paulsen, supra note 27, at 47-48.

58 Of course, Roe v. Wade's legal holding is somewhat distinct from this moral
proposition and goes a step further yet: Roe holds that the state may not treat the
human embryo or fetus as a human being, for purposes of being protected from the
private violence of others.
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persons that he or she has "no rights which the [born human population is] bound to respect" and thus "might justly and lawfully be reduced" to death r59

The quoted language is from Dred Scott, modified only slightly.
Of course, nothing in Dred Scott addresses the substance of abortion.
But it is appropriate to note the close affinity of the pro-choice philosophical argument with the moral stance of Dred Scott. In form, the
argument for abortion is identical in its first step of deciding to treat a
class of human life as nonetheless unworthy of equal regard as human
life. In common with Dred Scott; in common with arguments advanced
to justify the dehumanization and killing of Jews in Nazi Germany; in
common with racist arguments for genocide of any kind; in common
with arguments for apartheid or discrimination, a necessary premise
of the decision in.Roe is the ex ante decision-the choice--to deny or

denigrate the human status of the victim, so as to be able to remove
from moral blameworthiness the commission of harmful acts of violence or discrimination against such persons.
None of this decisively answers the question of Roe's evil or the
evil of abortion. It is possible to regard the denial of moral worth to
whole categories of human life in other situations-by American slavery, or Nazi Germany, or the Rwandan genocide-as atrocities beyond
belief but regard the denial of moral worth to human life in the form
of an unborn human fetus or embryo as morally justified. But once
the human fetus is understood to be human life, the presumption
(and thus the burden ofjustification) should rest very strongly against
those who would authorize, and constitutionalize, private violence
against such human life on the premise that such human life is unworthy of protection.
A standard form in which advocates for a right to commit abortion seek to overcome this presumption and meet this burden is what
I will call the "sliding-scale" argument, alluded to just a few
paragraphs ago. Roe's legal holding is, in form at least,"1° a version of
this argument: the right to abortion varies with the stage of pregnancy. The philosophical argument is rarely cast in explicit terms, but
must be that the "human" status of unborn human life, and thus the
moral worth to which it is entitled, varies with its stage of develop59 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857); FINKELMAN, supra
note 39, at 61.
60 But not in substance. As noted above, Roe's trimester framework, when considered in combination with the holding of the companion decision in Doe v. Bolton, in

fact creates a legal right of the woman to abort her child, for any reason or no reason,
throughout all nine months of pregnancy, subject to no substantive restriction. See
supra note 4.
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ment. It is easy to see why this argument has some intuitive appeal.

"Viability," especially, strikes many as a sensible line-could the unborn human life survive on his or her own, outside the womb. For
others, the onset of brain-wave or nerve activity, or the capacity to feel
pain, provides a line. Others, for traditional religious doctrinal reasons concerning when "ensoulment" occurs-when the unborn
human life has been given a "soul," and is thus morally worthy to be
treated as human life as a matter of such religious doctrine-draw a
line at a somewhat different point ("quickening"), based on these religious intuitions.
But from a logical and biological standpoint, anyone who thinks
seriously about the question must regard any such line as essentially
arbitrary. Itis the positingof a cut-off point, working backward along a
continuous line of pre-birth human development, for according
moral worth to human life. This is not to say that the "viability" intuition is foolish. As arbitrary moral cut-off points go, it is a fairly reasonable one. The same is true for the "brain-wave activity" point. It is
also not to say that the religious belief concerning when "ensoulment"
occurs is foolish. But from a purely secular, human perspective, such
a line is still arbitrary (even if one believes, on religious principle, that
God is entitled to draw lines that seem from a human perspective entirely arbitrary).'!' If one concedes that the human fetus is human life,
one cannot find a logical, non-arbitrary, principled point at which to
cut off the moral worth of that human life. If the human fetus is
human life, and as such is morally worthy of human status, he or she is
worthy of such status at all stages of pregnancy. To suggest otherwise
is to say that human life is worthy of moral status as human life at
61 I deeply respect and value both religious liberty and religion and would not
wish to be understood as disparaging religious principles in this regard. As I have
written elsewhere, the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty is premised,
at bottom, on the view "that God exists; that God makes claims on the loyalty of
human beings; and that these claims are prior to and superior in obligation to the
claims of the State." Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense
of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1597, 1598 (1997). If God indeed has
ordained that the "correct" line at which the human fetus is entitled to moral regard
is "quickening," that surely would permit born humans to draw such a moral line. I
do not believe that God in fact has drawn this arbitrary line. Still less would I believe
that, even had God done so, that this would equal God's authorization of the destruc-

tion of a human fetus or embryo by other humans, for any reason or none at all,
because of the existence of such a line. A claim of constitutional religious freedom to
kill a human fetus, even where based on a sincere religious conviction, should not
prevail over the life
of another member of the human family, and such human status
must be determined by objective criteria extrinsic to the religious faith of the person
seeking an abortion.
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some stages of life but not at others. Certainly some people might
hold that view. On what principle, however, may one human being
kill another human being on the ground that the second human being simply need not be regarded as such (according to the first)?
Other arguments for the permissibility of abortion implicitly (or
even explicitly) concede the moral entitlement of the human fetus to
respect as a form of human life, or at least do not vigorously contest
such status. They grant that the human fetus is morally worthy of protection against private violence (or, less straightforwardly, bracket the
issue by conceding only that the human fetus sometimes may be morally
worthy of protection against private violence), but nonetheless maintain that the autonomy rights of the violent actor trump the rights of
the fetus, in some or all circumstances. (This is the form of Judith
Jarvis Thompson's classic argument for abortion.) 6"2 Or, in a slight
variation, the argument is that the violent actor, and not his or her
victim, should possess the exclusive right to judge whether the violent
actor's autonomy rights trump the life of the victim. (This is, drastically compressed, the form of Professor Laurence Tribe's earliest argument for abortion rights.) (3i"
A great many moral questions ultimately can be distilled to the
weighing of competing claims of right, or of freedom of action. Abortion is no different. Even granting the status of the human fetus as
human life, entitled to moral regard as such, there are doubtless
"hard cases" where one might think that the value of giving full regard
to human life must yield to another value. Traditionally, private violence against the life of another sometimes may be justified, or excused, when such violence is necessary to save one's own life or the
life of an innocent third party. Thus, many pro-life advocates concede
that abortion is morally justifiable (or excusable) where necessary to
save the life of the child's mother. Conceding that the unborn
human fetus has moral worth as a human being, however, should affect the range of values that might plausibly be thought to justify killing that human life. Abortion for reasons of what might, with varying
degrees of cogency, be thought "self-defense" are one thing (e.g., life
of the mother, physical health of the mother, emotional health of the
62 Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, I

PHIL.

& Pun. AFF. 47 (1971).

63 Tribe, supra note 33. This is really the same argument as the argument that
the violent actor's rights trump the victim's. Presumably if one did not think that the

violent actor's rights were superior, one would not let that actor judge whether those
rights were superior if such judgment could lead (as of course it could) to the violent
actorjudging his or her rights to be superior to those of his or her victim. The rhetoric of judgment, or choice, or decisionmaking autonomy, adds nothing to the argument that one person's rights are deemed to prevail over another's.
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mother, rape, incest). Abortion for reasons of less morally defensible
self-interest are quite another (e.g., social convenience, economic
convenience, spite of the child's father, gender selection of a child,
economic profit).
One serious problem with the "balance of interests" approach is
that such determinations seem the natural province of the legislature
and not the judiciary. It is hard to justify Roe on those terms. Another
serious problem with this approach is that the rule of Roe v. Wade is
one of completely unrestricted, un-"balanced" choice: a woman may
choose abortion for essentially any reason at all, or no reason. Indeed, that is one of the grounds on which Roe may be regarded as a
colossal moral atrocity: the decision is not only unjustifiable as a matter of first principles of the rule of law, but authorizes, by judicial decree, private violence against innocent human life for any reason that
the violent private actor may wish to engage in it. Across a broad range of
circumstances-in the overwhelming majority of morally very easy
cases, as well as in hard cases involving a serious risk to the life or
health of the mother-Roe grants a complete and unrestricted private
license to some human beings to kill other human beings. That is a
moral atrocity of enormous proportions and one that cannot begin to
be justified by the existence of the far smaller number of exceptional
circumstances where it reasonably might be argued that such killing is
justifiable or excusable.
In short, the moral atrocity of Roe in terms of the substantive evil
of its result must be ranked as being even worse than Dred Scott. Once
the humanity of the human fetus is conceded, it all follows: it is worse
for one human to murder another than to enslave another. And Roe's
sanctioning of abortion-homicide has produced such killing on a massive scale. Approximately a million-and-a-half abortions a year in the
United States, for thirty years, is forty-five million acts of homicide authorized by judicial fiat unsupported by any fair reading of the
64
Constitution.
In one respect, however, Dred Scott v. Sandford may be worse than
Roe. The opinion in Roe reads more like an act of utter constitutional
incompetence than an intentional act of bad faith. The opinion is
obtuse, indifferent to constitutional text, poorly reasoned, and unquestionably "legislative" in its style and substance. But that seems to
64 It is true, of course, that some of these abortions may have been committed in
any event, either because state abortion laws did not prohibit them or as the result of
illegal conduct. It is an interesting empirical question how many abortions per year

in the United States are attributable to the Court's constitutionalization of abortion,
but there is no doubt that it is a hugely significant number.
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be what the Court, in 1973, thought it was supposed to do in such
matters. Viewed from the perspective of thirty years' distance, Roe
seems almost quaint-a relic of an era in which courts (and especially
the Supreme Court) understood their role as being to make law; to
resolve social issues; to prescribe rules for the nation. 65 The Supreme
CourtJustices in 1973 were, in a sense (at least to a degree), prisoners
of their own era, trapped in a set of assumptions about the judicial
role that were broadly accepted at the time, but are now regarded as
largely a fad (like lava lamps or bell-bottoms). Even the young, longsideburned Associate Justice William Rehnquist, in his Roe dissent,
does not appear outraged by the majority's decision; the Court is
wrong, and the Court is acting too legislature-like and Lochner-like,
Rehnquist says in criticism."" But he does not brand it as monstrous
or Dred Scott-like. He even says that the opinion "commands my
respect"!-

7

The contrast with, for example, Justice Scalia's impassioned dissents in Casey (in 1992, nearly twenty years after Roe) and in Stenberg
v. Carhart"9 (in 2000, twenty-seven years after Roe), in which Dred Scott
is explicitly held up as the image in the mirror of the Court's abortion
decisions, is striking.711 And while it is clear to all today that Roe, in
tandem with Doe v. Bolton, in fact created a regime of abortion-ondemand throughout all nine months of .pregnancy for any reason
agreed to by the mother and abortionist, the tone of the Roe opinion
is moderate. The opinion purports to recognize competing interests
65 For a discussion tracing the changes in dominant constitutional interpretive
paradigms, and noting the almost complete absence of prominent voices in support
of reliance on constitutional text, structure, history, and original understandings,
around the time Roe was decided, see Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra
note 25.
66 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
67
i. at 171 (RehnquistJ,, dissenting).
68 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
69 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
70 Justice Byron White's dissent in Roe contains some reasonably strong language,
but still seems to concede that the Court legitimately possessed the authority to take
the action it did:
As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do
what it does today; but in my view itsjudgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power .... In a sensitive area such as this, involving as
it does issues over which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I
cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of constitutional
choice ....
Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
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of importance, and the "legislative" solution crafted has the look and

71
feel of an attempt at compromise and balancing.
To be sure, none of this excuses Roe. The Justices knew enough
about reading the words of the Constitution-Hugo Black had not
long been off the Court-that one can hardly say that this was an interpretive methodology that no one had ever heard of, or that was
held in universal disrepute. And even if the Court conceived of its
role as "doing justice," that would not excuse the terrible moral blindness and tragic perversion of substantive justice in the Court's actions.
Nonetheless there is at least some sense in which the Justices in the
majority surely thought that they were acting in entire good faith, and
in accordance with their sense of constitutional duty and legitimate
authority. Even those who vehemently oppose Roe might say the justices (or some of them) ought to be forgiven, for they knew not what
they were doing.
The judgment of history is that one cannot say even this for Chief
Justice Taney's opinion for the Court in Dred Scott. If Roe reads like an

act of gross negligence, Dred Scott reads more like a deliberate act of

violence against the Constitution, for the sake of slavery. The Court
seemingly went out of its way to create as much pro-slavery law, on as
many points as possible, as absolutely as possible. More than that,
Dred Scott was an arrogant attempt by the Taney Court to leverage the
prestige of the Supreme Court to "settle" the divisive slavery issue for

all time, in favor of one side-the South. In that respect, the evil of
Dred Scott was enlarged by the Court's seemingly intentional, willful
infliction of it, and its haughty pretension that it should be regarded
as having the legitimate authority to impose its will on the Constitution and on the Nation.
71 It is entirely possible that at least some of the Justices in the Roe majority did
not realize the full implications of the Roe and Doe decisions. Chief Justice Burger
joined the majority in Roe, then retreated thirteen years later, protesting that the
course that abortion law had taken was not remotely what he thought he was agreeing
to in 1973. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
783 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I regretfully conclude that some of the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Roe, as well as the concerns I expressed in my separate opinion, have now been realized."). For echoes of this phenomenon in the
person of Justice Kennedy, a half-generation later, compare Casey, 505 U.S. ;it 833
(Joint Opinion, co-authored by Kennedy), with Carhar, 530 U.S. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787-88 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). See also Carhart, 530 U.S. at 954 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (finding that result
in Carhartis not "merely a regrettable misapplication of Casey .... but Casey's logical
and entirely predictable consequence"); id. at 955 ("There is no cause for anyone who
believes in Casey to feel betrayed by this outcome."); cf Matthew 27:3-5.
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As I have set forth above, an already bad constitutional decision is
all the worse to the extent it is made intentionally, with full knowledge
of its terrible consequences, and in the arrogant expectation that it
will work to entrench the Court's decision permanently. Dred Scott is
of course atrocious for the evil it imposed: the dehumanization of
blacks as having "no rights that the white man is bound to respect. '72
But Dred Scott did not create slavery and the Court could not properly
have abolished slavery even if it were so inclined. Indeed, as noted
above, a plausible argument can be made that Scott was not legally
entitled to his freedom under the governing law of the day. Beyond
its gratuitous racism, then, the chief evil consequences of Dred Scott
were the entrenchment and extension of slavery, the invalidation of the
Missouri Compromise, the resulting evisceration of any possibility of
political compromise over the expansion of slavery, and the de facto
outlawing of the Republican Party platform. It might be going too far
to say that the Dred Scott decision was a proximate cause of the Civil
War, but it certainly was, with other events, a significant catalyst in the
chain of events leading to war and death on a massive scale. On any
measure, Dred Scott produced harmful, evil results rivaled by few other
decisions in the Court's history. What is interesting is that such evil
resulted as much from the Court's authoritarian prohibition of political compromise, and its enshrinement of a permanent pro-slavery position as law of the land, as from its specific result.
The Court in Roe committed a grievous wrong, producing arguably a worse moral evil than did the Court in Dred Scott. Whether intentional or not, Roe's grotesque deformation of the Constitution
resulted in some of the greatest evil in our nation's constitutional history, authorizing private violence on an almost unimaginable scale.
But the Taney Court that decided Dred Scott inflicted its evil with full
knowledge of exactly what it was doing. The Justices may have
thought they were doing right, but they could not have thought they
were doing law. What makes Dred Scott especially maddening is the
insidious manipulation of constitutional texts and legitimate methodologies. Taney's perverted legal "craftsmanship"-his supposed interpretation of legal texts and deference to the imputed intentions of the
framers, and his manipulation of levels of abstraction (for example,
transforming the Constitution's pro-slavery Fugitive Slave Clause into
a general constitutional protection of slavery)-make it harder to disentangle the evil inflicted by the Court from the forms of law in which
the Court wrapped itself. In this, too, the Court in Dred Scott knew
what it was doing: it was imposing its will, contrary to the Constitution,
72

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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in order to support one side of a social dispute and to wrap that resolution, dishonestly, in the forms of law and in the Court's prestige, in
order to insulate its action from -challenge and to leverage its holding
forward in time.
Enter Planned Parenthoodv. Casey. If Roe v. Wade equals Dred Scott
v. Sandford in its lawlessness and exceeds it in the degree of harm or
evil it produces; and if Dred Scott bests Roe in the category of the willfulness or intentionality with which the Court acted to impose its will
and leverage its lawlessness forward, Casey combines the worst features
of both. Casey reaffirms and extends the lawlessness and evil of Roe,
and it does so willfully and intentionally, seeking to extend that result
and insulate it from future challenge. What Casey adds to Roe is willfulness, full awareness of what was at stake, and deliberate entrenchment of a deeply vulnerable legal ruling and result that a majority of
the Justices probably believed was wrong as a matter of first principles
of constitutional law and of morality. It adds a somewhat more plausible, and therefore all the more pernicious, pretext of legal regularity
than had been articulated in Roe, but it is not an honest one. It adds
grandiosity, pomposity, and vanity-an almost comical arrogance and
tone of self-importance. And it adds some outright authoritarian substance. If even half these charges are true, Casey handily outdistances
Roe and Scott for the ignominious title of the "Worst Constitutional
Decision of All Time."
Let me take Casey's distinctive "contributions"-the ways in which
it goes beyond Roe-one at a time:
First, Casey adds knowledge and willfulness. As noted, if the Justices
who decided Roe can be let off the hook at all, it would be on the
theory that they did not realize the full consequences of what they
were doing; that they were prisoners of the jurisprudential perceptions of their age and honestly believed they were announcing a sensible, balanced compromise on the abortion issue. By the time Casey
was decided in 1992, nineteen years later, it was clear to everybody
how controversial Roe was, both as a matter of legal methodology and
as a matter of morality and social policy. Indeed, it is no exaggeration
to say that Roe had come to define the jurisprudential debate over the
legitimate role of the judiciary in society and the proper scope and
manner of constitutional review by the courts of legislative acts.
Nearly a dozen abortion cases had made their way to the Supreme
Court in the years after Roe. just three years earlier, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,7 '1the Court had come within a whisker's breadth
73

492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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of straightforwardly overruling Roe, producing bitter rifts and frayed
nerves among the Justices that burst into public view.7 4 The Roe issue
had energized advocates and academics on both sides. Other cases
involving "substantive due process" claims had become obvious stalking horses for the more central issue of abortion. 75 For more than a
decade before Casey, Roe had been the central "litmus test" question
in Supreme Court judicial confirmation hearings-an experience
made famous in the hearings on rejected nominee Robert Bork in
1987, but shared in substantial measure by Justice O'Connor (1981),
Justice Kennedy (1987), and Justice Souter (1990)-the authors of
the Joint Opinion in Casey-as well as by Justice Scalia (1986), Chief
Justice Rehnquist (in the hearings on his elevation, in 1986), andJustice Thomas (1991). Massive protests and counter-protests over Roe
and abortion had become regular occurrences surrounding the Supreme Court grounds. Abortion was a hot issue in 1973. It was an
inferno by 1992. Everybody was fully aware of how much the Court's
own decision in Roe had served to throw gas on the fire, fueling the
social and political debate over abortion with an equally hot controversy over the Court itself.
Revealingly, the Court in Casey begins its opinion by noting these
realities, and makes scattered references to them throughout. In the
first paragraph, the Court notes that in the decade immediately preceding, the United States had five times filed briefs urging the Court
74 For a good example, see Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, agreeing with the
Court's disposition of the case but "strongly dissent[ing] from the manner in which it
has been reached" and condemning the approach ofJustice O'Connor's concurrence
as one that "cannot be taken seriously." Id. at 532, 537 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75
3owers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), is the most obvious example, with the
Court splitting 5-4 on the legitimacy of judicial creation of new substantive due process rights, in a case involving a claim of homosexual sexual privacy as against a state
sodomy prohibition. Michael H. v. erald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), is another obvious
example, with a divided Court splitting chiefly as to methodological premises-premises that obviously had a deeper potential impact on abortion than for the issue of
family law paternity presumption disputes presented by the case.
My favorite example of a stalking horse is Burnham v. Superior Court of California,
495 U.S. 604 (1990), a territorial jurisdiction case (of all things). The Court was
unanimous that the California courts could exercise territorial jurisdiction in a family
law dispute over a non-resident husband physically served with process in California
while on a business trip and visit with his children. But the Court split vociferously on
the methodology of interpretation of the Due Process Clause, in a way that seems
explainable (in intensity at least) only on the ground thatsuch methodological premises would presumably be transferable to the abortion dispute. (The anti-Roe "conservatives" disfavored evolving judicial standards; the pro-Roe "liberals" disfavored
originalism as a limitation on judicial discretion.)
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to overrule Roe as wrongly decided. 76 The Joint Opinion is careful to
note, repeatedly and often quite awkwardly, that the Justices comprising the majority are not necessarily in agreement with Roe's resolution
of the constitutional issues with respect to abortion, even though they
vote to uphold it on the basis of the doctrine of "stare decisis"77 (a
point I address presently). Indeed, given the votes and opinions of
some of the Justices in the Casey majority in earlier cases, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that one or more of the Joint Opinion Troika
78
believed that Roe was wrongly decided.
All of this is by way of saying that one cannot forgive the Court in
Casey, as one might charitably excuse the Court in Roe, on the theory
that they knew not what they were doing. The Court in Casey knew
exactly what it was doing. It knew the jurisprudential stakes; it knew
the moral arguments; it knew the reality of what abortion was and
what abortion does. The Court did what it did with full knowledge of
the consequences. The Justices in the majority knew (or certainly
should have known) that their decision would perpetuate a nationwide rule of freedom to commit abortion, and that legal abortion
would continue to exist in the United States at a rate of a million-and76

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).

77 Id. at 857 ("whether or not mistaken"); id. at 861 ("with whatever degree of
personal reluctance any of us may have"); id. at 869 ("A decision to overrule Roe's
essential holding . . .would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to tileNation's
commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of
Roe's original decision, and we do so today."); id.("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.");
id. at 871 ("We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the
Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter,
would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a
ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. The
matter is not before us in the first instance, and coining as it does after nearly 20 years

of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that the immediate question is not the
soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be

accorded to its holding."); id. at 901 ("We accept our responsibility not to retreat
from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all our precedents.").
78 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 232 (1993)
(noting that the decision in Cas
O ,was a change of positions for both Justice O'Connor
andJustice Kennedy). Justice Scalia makes the point acidly: "It is particularly difficult,

in the circumstances of the present decision, to sit still for the Court's lengthy lecture
upon the virtues of 'constancy,' ... of 'remain [ing] steadfast,' and adhering to 'principle' . . . . Among the five Justices who purportedly adhere to Roe, at most three
agree upon the principle that constitutes adherence ... and that principle is inconsistent with Roe .... To make matters worse, two of the three, in order thus to remain

steadfast, had to abandon previously stated positions." Casey, 505 U.S. at 997 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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a-half human fetuses a year. And they knew that the opposite decision, overruling Roe, would lead to a significant reduction in that
number. The deaths of millions of unborn human fetuses rested on
the Justices' decision. They knew that. And they consciously chose
the course of reaffirming Roe, even though some of them undoubtedly believed both that Roe was wrong as a matter of constitutional law
and that abortion is the taking of innocent human life.
It is worth pausing for a moment to let this sink in, for it is a
sobering observation about the human condition. Some of the individualJustices who voted to reaffirm Roe apparently did so in knowing violation
of both law and personal conscience. I will have more to say about this in

the conclusion, Part III, of this Article. But for now it is sufficient to
note that, if this is true, the votes of such Justices (a most inapt title
under the circumstances) were cast in willful, affirmative, knowing
complicity with evil.
There may be explanations that tend to mitigate the culpability of
such complicity: an unintentional moral blindness as to consequences; a tendency to undervalue the lives of others as compared to
one's other objectives (or the objectives of the society in which one
lives); or ordinary human cowardice. But there is really no escaping
the judgment that, for a Justice who believed that Roe was legally and
morally wrong, deliberately and knowingly to reaffirm it is to act in
complicity with evil. It is to be present at Auschwitz, with power to
prevent it, but to look the other way; to tolerate and even endorse the
Holocaust when one had the capacity to stop it.
How close a parallel is there between Casey and Dred Scott in this
regard? Even if one is prepared to believe, charitably, that the Taney
Court thought it was doing the right thing (by its own lights), it cannot be denied that what they believed was the "right thing" was the
protection, and extension, of the institution of slavery, in a way not
fairly attributable to the Constitution. The Taney Court knew the
human consequences of its decision. Casey is arguably a little worse
even than that. For if (some of) the Justices who decided Casey not
only knew the human consequences of their act, but also thought that
those human consequences were harmful and evil, their manipulation
of legal forms in support of that conclusion properly might be
deemed yet more blameworthy than the ridiculous textual mis-analysis
of Dred Scott (and of Roe for that matter). The Joint Opinion in Casey
contains considerable hand-wringing. There is evidence of a consciousness of guilt on the part of the Justices who wrote the Joint
Opinion that is not present in Dred Scott. The Casey collaboratorsthose who thought Roe wrongly decided and who also understood, at
some level, the moral wrong of abortion-evidently did not think that
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their legal arguments were being put to the service of a just cause, in
the way that the majority in Dred Scott may have thought they were
doing.
Or did they? Does the parallel to Dred Scott, in terms of the Justices' mens rea in Casey, begin to fall apart if one grants (for the sake
of argument) the possible sincerity of the Justices' views of the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis (a doctrine I will discuss presently)? Perhaps. But look where that proposition leads. It suggests

that those Justices who believed Roe to be legally wrong as an original
matter, and morally wrong as an ongoing matter, valued more highly
than the deaths of millions the institutionalimportance of the legal doctrine of
stare decisis in maintainingpublicperceptions of the legitimacy and integrity of
the Supreme Court.
In previous writing, I have examined at length the doctrinal arguments advanced by the Court in Casey on behalf of the Court's general
policy of stare decisis, and found them wanting.7 9 I will not repeat
that analysis here, in part because the Casey Court itself did not rest on
these arguments. Rather, a significant part of Casey's justification for
the judicial doctrine of stare decisis (the doctrine, as the Court in
Casey itself conceded, is one of judicial policy, not constitutional requirement)8" is that it enhances public perceptions of the Court's
(and its members') integrity, and thus safeguards the Court's power."'
Is this something to be praised? The Justices in the majority in
Casey actually seem to have thought so. A great deal of the pompous,
overwrought rhetoric of the opinion (Section III.C of Casey8 2 ) is directed toward convincing the reader of exactly that proposition. The
Court spoke of "the terrible price" of overruling even an erroneous
precedent, specifically, that it would "seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme
Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law."8 For us "[t] o understand why this would be so," it was necessary for the Court to explain
"the
the intimate relationship between "this Court's authority" and
84
Republic."
constitutional
a
as
itself
of
country's understanding
The Casey Court then goes on to say that "the Court cannot buy
support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor
79
80
81
82

See generally Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1543-67.
See id. at 1537 n.1 (collecting cases); id. at 1543-51.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69.
Id.
1d. at 864, 865 ("In the present cases ... the terrible price would be paid for

83
overruling.").

84

Id. at 865.
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degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. '8 5
The Court continues, "The Court's power lies, rather in its legitimacy,
a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's
acceptance of the Judiciaryasfit to determine what the Nation's law means and
to declare what it demands."8 6 There is something to this, of course. If

the nation came to view a decision of the Supreme Court as fundamentally illegitimate (much as a good part of the nation rapidly came
to view Dred Scott), the Court could well find its decision not only disrespected, but disobeyed.
And properly so, I submit. Why should a lawless Supreme Court
decision, manifestly contrary to the Constitution, have any claim to
the obedience of other actors in our constitutional system? The Constitution is supreme law; judicial decisions contrary to it should be regarded as void, and should neither be enforced by the executive nor
obeyed by the people.8 7 Nor, I submit, should they be followed by
judges in subsequent cases. By the same reasoning that yields judicial
review-the supremacy of the Constitution, and the concomitant implication that acts of subordinate agencies, contrary to the Constitution, are void and should be given no effectS8 -a judicial decision
contrary to the Constitution is void and should be treated as being of
no obligation on the executive to enforce or on subsequent courts to
follow as precedent.
Lurking in Casey's ostentatious rhetoric is recognition of that
truth: "our contemporary understanding is such that a decision with-

out principled justification would be no judicial act at all," the Court
concedes. 89 The Court then goes on to speak of the need, therefore,
to guard itself against the public "questioning the legitimacy of the
85
86

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

87 1 have developed this proposition at considerable length in other writing.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch:Executive Power To Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five
Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1349-59 (1999).
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) ("There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act
of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void.... To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than
his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do
not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid."); accord Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).

89

Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.

2003)

THE WORST CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISION OF ALL TIME

1031

Court,"'9 0 which it might do if the court were to overrule cases too
frequently or overrule a "watershed" decision-that is, an especially
controversial or divisiye decision that constituted an abrupt or radical
departure from prior understandings of the law.9 ' Thus,
[t]he Court's duty in the present case is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive issue of governmental power to limit
personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new
resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing
on that issue, its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown
only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding

under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of
92
law.

This is an astonishing proposition. What if the thing that makes a
decision a "watershed" is that it was a grotesque departure from the
Constitution-a massive, unfounded judicial coup d'etat taken in the
name of the Constitution? The notion that the more dramatic a precedent's departure from the Constitution, the more tenaciously the
Court should cling to it-lest the people recognize the departure for
the lawlessness it is-is positively repulsive. It stands on its head the
very foundations of judicial review: the priority of the Constitution;
the subordinacy of the agencies created under its authority; the duty
to adhere to the former as against the departures of the latter. The
Court in Casey instead says the most monstrous thing imaginable: that
the Court should adhere to even clearly wrong decisions, and especially to its most egregiously wrong decisions, so that it can avoid damage to its own legitimacy and maintain its power. 9If the Court in Dred Scott was driven by the base motive of expanding and protecting slavery, the Court in Casey was driven by the
base motive of expanding and protecting its own power. The Justices
(or at least enough of them to make a difference to the outcome of
90 Id. at 866.
91 Id. at 867.
92 Id. at 868-69.
93 The Court's reasoning is illogical to boot. Why would public perceptions of
the Court's legitimacy be better enhanced by stubborn adherence to erroneous prece-.
dent rather than a willingness to overrule it? As the Casey dissenters noted, the Court
might just as readily (if not more readily) be perceived as succumbing to political
pressure by adhering to Roe rather than overruling it. Id. at 963-64 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 998-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the case) valued this more highly than the human lives at stake and
valued it highly enough to affirm a precedent they believed wrong.
The point can be put more strongly yet: the Justices valued their own
prestige and power enough to be willing to acquiesce in the death of
94
millions of innocent human lives in order to achieve it.
The Court knew what it was doing. It knew the consequences of
its actions. It knew it was doing wrong. And it did it anyway, for the
sake of enhancing its own power and prestige. This alone makes the
reaffirmation of Roe in Casey a greater judicial atrocity than the origi-

nal decision in Roe.
This brings me to the second thing (or cluster of related things)
that Casey adds to Roe. Casey adds deliberate entrenchment of Roe, an
attempt to leverage that entrenchment forward in time permanently,
and an effort to de-legitimize criticism of both the Court's original decision and the Court's entrenchment of it.
Consider first the simple fact of entrenchment of Roe. I submit
that one must rank Casey as a greater evil than Roe simply because it
reaffirms, extends, and entrenches Roe for the foreseeable future. Roe
had been around for only nineteen years when Casey was decided and
was teetering on the edge of being overruled. If Roe worked a great
injustice, it was an injustice with a relatively short shelf life but for
Casey's extension of it into the indefinite future. Plessy v. Ferguson, for
example, ruled for seventy years before Brown v. Board of Education
disapproved it.15 Unless one thinks that the creation of a constitu-

tional right to abortion virtually compelled its subsequent reaffirmation
in Casey-an implausible position, in that the Court has never adhered to a strict notion of stare decisis (not to mention that it would
suggest that Plessy virtually compelled its own reaffirmation in
Brown)-it is impossible to blame Roe for abortion law after 1992.
That blame rests with Casey. As noted at the outset of this Article, the
long-term impact of Casey is likely to outdistance that of Roe. It is
probable, I fear, that Casey will remain the governing constitutional
rule for the lifetimes of everybody who is alive and old enough to read
these words at or about the time they are published.
94 In addition to valuing its own power and prestige more highly than human
lives and preserving the Constitution, the Casey Court's vision of what gives it "legitimacy" is also deeply flawed. The tegitimacy of the Cotrt in our constitutional system

surely does not rest on its ability to garner public respect or to fashion astute political
compromises, but on its ability to render objective legal judgment faithfully to the
Constitution. See Paulsen, supra note 78, at 229-30.
95 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), ovemuled in pertinent pat by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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There is a reason for this. The Court consciously intended that
its reaffirmation of Roe be regarded as permanent, and that such permanence be viewed as indispensable to the rule of law.91 6 Indeed, it is
fair to say that attaining this goal, as much as justifying the Court's
reaffirmation of Roe, is what the opinion labors so mightily to accomplish. Casey stakes the claim that adherence to stare decisis, at least
with respect to dramdtic, "watershed" constitutional rulings of the
Court, is of fundamental importance to the rule of law. In the end,
the Court's reasoning is unpersuasive at any of a number of levels
(which I will discuss presently). But the claimed need to adhere to
the doctrine of stare decisis has such a strong superficial appeal to
lawyers steeped in the common-law method of lawmaking by judicial
precedent, and has such a strong intuitive appeal to large segments of
the general public, that it is difficult to disentangle and set straight.
The Court's reliance on stare decisis, as a doctrine of supposed judicial restraint, creates a far more powerful image of adherence to the
legal task than did Roe's transparently legislative opinion creating constitutional abortion rights out of thin air and thin precedents. This
makes Casey more insidious than Roe. Unlike Roe, the Court's opinion
in Casey is likely to be effective in entrenching abortion rights.
And that is precisely what the Court set out to accomplish. As set
forth above in Part I, the "criteria" Part of this Article, the more that
an erroneous, harmful decision is broadly cast and prospective in its
application, or adopts a sweeping principle concerning the decision's
own generative consequences for the future, the more that the deciSion's evil is magnified and the more it should be regarded as an
7
atrocity.
Abraham Lincoln understood this danger. His 1858 senatorial
candidacy, and his 1860 presidential candidacy, were largely driven by
the notion that Dred Scott must not be allowed to be repeated, confirmed,
or extended. He was prepared to accept the judgment of the Court,
however incredibly flawed, as the judgment of the Court for that case,
and even as stating the governing legal rule for future cases, unless
overruled. But he was determined not to see a "Second Dred Scott decision" extending the right to own slaves into the free states as well,
and thought it important to resist Dred Scott so that it not become a
98

precedent.
96

Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69.
97 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
98 Hear Lincoln on the force of precedent, first in his June 1857 speech on the
Dred Scott case, and then in parts of his campaign debates with Stephen Douglas:
Judicial decisions have two uses-first, to absolutely determine the case decided, and secondly, to indicate to the public how other similar cases will be
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decided when they arise. For the latter use, they are called "precedents" and
"authorities."
We believe, as much asJudge Douglas, (perhaps more) in obedience to,
and respect for the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not
only the particular cases decided, but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the Constitution as provided in
that instrument itself. More than this would be revolution. But we think the
Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has often
over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it to overrule this. We offer no resistance to it.

Judicial decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances. That this should be so, accords both with common
sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession.
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the
departments throughout our history, and had been in no part, based on
assumed historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of

these, it had been before the court more than once, and had there been
affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a
precedent.
But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public
confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful,
to treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the conntry ....
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech on Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), in 1 AiRAHIAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858: SPEECHES, LETTERS, AND MISCELANEOUS WRITINGS, TIlE LINCOI.N-DoucLAS DEBATES 390, 392-93 (Library of America ed. 1989). On the potential for the Court to render a "Second Dred
Scott" decision, see ABRAHAM LINCOLN, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois
(June 16, 1858), in 1 AiiRAHAM LINCO.N: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858:
SI'EECHES,

LE'I'rERS, AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINcS, TI!HE LINCOLN-DouGA.AS

DEBATES

426, 432 (Library of America ed. 1989) ("We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that
the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State fiee; and we shall awake
to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet
and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would
prevent that consummation."); ABRAH AM LINCOLN, Portion of Speech at Edwardsville,
Illinois (Sept. I1, 1858), in 1 ABRA!-lAM LINCOLN: SPEECIES AN! WRITINGS 1832-1858:
SPEECIIES,

LErIERS, AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS,

THE LINCOLN-DOuGLAS

DEBATES

580, 584 (Library of America ed. 1989) ("I have stated what cannot be gainsayedthat the grotnds upon which this decision is made are equally applicable to the Free
States as to the Free Territories, and that the peculiar reasons put forth by judge
Douglas for endorsing this decision, commit him in advance to the next decision, and
to all other decisions emanating from the same source."); ABRAHAM LIN(:OLN, Fifth
Lincoln-Douglas Debate at Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858), in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
1832-1858: SPEECHIES, LE-rrERS, AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITIN.S, THE LINCO.N-DouG;LAS DEBATE:S 701, 715 (Library of America ed. 1989) ("[1] t is

SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
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Casey makes Roe a precedent. Rather than a discredited doctrine,
repudiated by subsequent cases, Roe became, at a critical point ten
years ago, a repeatedly reaffirmed decision. Casey is, with respect to
Roe, Lincoln's feared "Second Dred Scott." Its principal effect is to entrench and legitimize Roe. If one grants that Roe was wrong as an original matter, as even some of the Justices in the Casey majority appear
to do, Casey's principal effect is deliberate entrenchment of what had
been (prior to Casey itself) the most egregious error in our nation's
constitutional history. As Lincoln well knew, the repeated reaffirmation of a doctrine does tend to entrench it. As a practical matter, Casey
may have made, and certainly appears to have been intended to make,
the constitutional right to abortion irreversible by our legal systemeven though a majority of the Court apparently believed that Roe was
wrongly decided.
That is outrageous enough. But the Court not only deliberately
entrenched an egregious error, it adopted a Grand Theory of Egregious Error Entrenchment-a full-blown (if still incoherent) doctrine
of (selective) stare decisis, occupying nearly sixteen full pages of the
United States Reports, and possessing a superficial veneer of lawfulness.
It is that veneer of lawfulness, and the substance beneath it, that
makes the decision in Casey so pernicious. The stare decisis doctrine
articulated by the Court in Casey is not very defensible on its own
terms. The doctrine is transparently manipulable. The obligation to
adhere to precedent is not absolute. None of the factors is absolute.
In fact, it is fair to say that, under Casey, the present doctrine of stare
decisis does not require adherence to the present doctrine of stare
decisis, but fails on each and every factor the Court articulated-workability, reliance, stability, consistency, and even the objective of preserving public impressions of judicial integrity.19 In practical terms,
the doctrine means that precedent is followed, except when it isn't.l"",
It was utterly spurious for the Court in Casey to have claimed that
the doctrine of stare decisis compelled its decision, for it plainly did
my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its
present form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right
of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is not
sustained by the elections."). See also ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1861), in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865:
SPEECHES, LETrERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES AND PROCLAMA-

215, 220-21 (Library of America ed. 1989).
99 For a point-by-point doctrinal critique of Casey's doctrine of stare decisis, see
Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1543-67.
100 Paulsen, supra note 28, at 678-81.
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not, even on the terms the Court claimed for the doctrine.""' It is not,
and cannot be, the true ground for the decision in the case-the
Court overruled two previous cases and reconfigured its trimester
framework extensively in concept (though not with much effect on
the substance of the abortion right created by Roe). How could the
Court have overruled two other abortion decisions if stare decisis were
seriously understood to require adherence to precedent "whether or
not mistaken"?1" 2 The Court's stated reliance on an elaborate doctrine of stare decisis for the result in Casey appears to be a disingenuous "cover"-and not a very good one-for a decision reached on the
grounds of perceived political expediency and the desire to enhance
the Court's political power. The stare decisis rationale in Casey is,
thus, not only incoherent and unprincipled. In the circumstances of
the case, in light of what the majority actually did, to invoke a grand
doctrine of stare decisis as a ground of decision was outright
dishonest. 1'

A third thing Casey adds to Roe-beyond knowledge and willfulness; beyond deliberate entrenchment of error and a dishonest rationale to justify it-is the distressingly authoritarian nature of the
decision. To be sure, for fifty years (at least), the Court has asserted
its supremacy over all other branches of government with regard to
constitutional interpretation. 1 14 But rarely, if ever, has the Court
been so brazen in its assertions that disagreement with its constitutional interpretations is not merely ineffective, but illegitimate. Casey's
rhetoric seeks not only to legitimize the Court's adherence to Roe, but
to de-legitimize any continued opposition to Roe or to the Court's au101 If stare decisis compelled Casey, then it would have compelled reaffirmation of
Plessy in Brown. See Paulsen & Rosen, supra note 28, at 1297-3000 (satirizing Casey by
changing the subject matter, and a relatively very few words from the passages concerning stare decisis).
102 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. The two cases overruled in Casey were Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
103 To the extent the doctrine of stare decisis is taken seriously, it is also unconstitutional. Consider what Casey claims: a decision must (sometimes) be adhered to
"whether or not mistaken." Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. This contradicts the first principle
of constitutional supremacy, the foundation of Marbury v. Madison and all of judicial
review. If a prior judicial decision is contrary to the Constitution, a subsequent interpreter must adhere to the Constitution, not to the faithless judicial misinterpretation.
See also Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1548-49 n.38 (collecting authorities and arguments
for the proposition that stare decisis, if taken seriously, is affirmatively unconstittitional under the reasoning of Federalist No. 78 and Marbuiy v. Madison).
104 I have challenged this assertion at length in earlier writing. See sources cited
supra note 87.
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thority generally. Casey not only makes Roe a precedent. Casey itself is a
precedent about precedents and about the duty of all others to comply
and to submit. Casey proclaims that the time for resisting Roe has ended. The Court has "call [ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution."115 Then, in a passage that has
already gained a fair degree of familiarity and notoriety as the "tested
by following" passage, the Court writes as follows:
Some cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a
constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who refuses to
work to undermine the decision or to force its reversal. The price
may be criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence. An extra price
will be paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision's
results when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who nevertheless struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law. To
all those who will be so tested by following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for
nothing. 106
Putting aside the Court's self-praise of its own virtue, this is a notvery-subtle authoritarian lesson. Those who disapprove of the Court's
"results when viewed outside of constitutional terms"-the implication being that disliking results is understandable but that the Constitution impersonally commands this result-but who, as all good and
virtuous citizens should, in the Court's view, "nevertheless struggle to
accept it" are to be commended and protected, because they have
been "tested" and found loyal to the Court. They have accepted what
they believe is wrong "because they respect the rule of law"-a concept the Court finds identical with its own decisions. The Court proceeds in the next paragraph of the opinion to refer to "the character
of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law"
as being "not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and
speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.'' 1 7 The Court
in Casey wants us to know just how important it is to love Big Brother.
It is difficult to imagine a more un-democratic sentiment, one less
faithful to the Constitution or the principles of the American Revolution, and one less consonant with the idea of the "rule of law." For
the Casey Court, the "rule of law" is obedience-obeisance-to the

105
106

Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
Id. at 867-68.

107

Id. at 868.
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authoritarian rule of the Court. Liberty finds no refuge in ajurisprudence of authoritarianism.
Casey's stare decisis reasoning is dreadful on three levels. First, it
reaffirmed and perpetuated Roe. Second, it adopted a Grand Theory
of Error Entrenchment that is awful in its own right. And third, it
declared opposition to its entrenchment of Roe, to its grand theory, or
to the Court, as opposition to the rule of law itself.
As set forth in Part I, the tendency of a decision to generate additional evil is yet a further strike against it. I"s A discussion of how Casey
has magnified and multiplied Roe's wrong would not be complete
without a brief look at the Supreme Court's most recent abortion decision, Stenberg v. Carhart."'9 Carhart is the "partial-birth" abortion
case, decided by the Court by vote of 5-4, in 2000. A "partial-birth"
abortion (otherwise known as "dilation and extraction" abortion, or
"D&X") is accomplished by inducing labor late in the second or third
trimester of pregnancy, delivering the entire infant except the head,
crushing the infant's head with a scissors, vacuuming the infant's
brains out of the head, collapsing the skull, and then delivering the
rest of the child's remains. The majority described the procedure
with a cold, clinical, bloodless candor that is positively stomachchurning. II"
108 Casey's theory of stare decisis, notwithstanding its incoherence, may well have
had the consequence of generating further harm in the form of leading to the reaffir-

mation of other judicial errors in unrelated areas of constitutional law. (And, of
course, Casey's doctrine of precedent and judicial power could generate other errors
in the future.) To be sure, it is difficult to say how far Casey truly has caused the Court
to rely on stare decisis in other cases, precisely because the doctrine is manipulable.
But the doctrine still retains a great capacity to mislead and confuse, and the Court
has, in the decade since Casey, reaffirmed at least one other dubious precedent of
major substantive consequence-Miranda v. Anzona-largely on the basis of principles of stare decisis. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), reafJg Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
109 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
110 Citing medical evidence, the Court stated,
If the fetus presents head first (a vertex presentation), the doctor collapses
the skull; and the doctor then extracts the entire fetus through the cervix. If
the fetus presents feet first (a breech presentation), the doctor pulls the fetal
body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through
the cervix.
Id. at 927. The Court also quoted the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist's description of the "breech-conversion intact D&E" as
including the following steps: "1.deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually
over a sequence of days; 2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling
breech; 3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and 4. partial
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The majority in Carhart held that the Constitution forbids a state
from enacting laws prohibiting this type of abortion procedure. The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, relied on Casey and
stare decisis as its starting point. There was no need to consider the
question of whether the Constitution confers a right to abortion, notwithstanding the conceded importance of the issue, and the stakes to
both sides; that question, the Carhartmajority said, was already resolved. The only question was how to apply the Court's abortion jurisprudence to the procedure in question."I ' The majority concluded
that Nebraska's prohibition of this procedure "violates the Federal
Constitution, as interpreted in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey ..... ,12 relying to a significant degree on the absence of an
exception to this prohibition, even as to viable fetuses, for the sake of
the mother's "health" as that term was defined in Doe v. Bolton.' " The
five Justices in the Carhart majority did not blink. They looked the
horror of this killing procedure straight in the eye and explained that
their past abortion decisions should be extended to create a constitutional right to commit what is essentially infanticide as well.

evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus."

Id. at 928.
III See id. at 920-21. The Court stated,
We again consider the right to an abortion. We understand the controversial nature of the problem. Millions of Americans believe that life begins at
conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death
of an innocent child; they recoil at the thought of a law that would permit it.
Other millions fear that a law that forbids abortion would condemn many
American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty
and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal abortions with the
attendant risks of death and suffering. Taking account of these virtually irreconcilable points of view, aware that constitutional law must govern a society whose different members sincerely hold directly opposing views, and
considering the matter in light of the Constitution's guarantees of fundamental individual liberty, this Cotrt, in the course of a generation, has deter-

mined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic protection
to the woman's right tc choose. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). We shall not revisit those legal
principles. Rather, we apply them to the circumstances of this case.
112 Id. at 929-30.
113 As noted above, the Doe "health" exception requirement essentially means that
abortion can be had for any reason through all nine months of pregnancy. See supra
note 4.
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All of this makes Casey the worst constitutional decision of the
Supreme Court in our nation's history. The decision wrongly holds
that the Constitution of the United States enshrines as a nearly absolute right the prerogative of a woman to abort her unborn child for
essentially any reason. There is no basis-absolutely no basis-in the
language of the Constitution for such a holding. It is thus a fundamental betrayal of the Court's responsibility of faithfulness to that
document. The decision produces-perpetuates-a great substantive
evil, sanctioning an ongoing American genocide of amazing proportions. The decision does all this knowingly and intentionally. This
was no accidental or negligent misreading of the Constitution or misfiring of analysis. The Court that committed Casey committed it with
full knowledge of what it was doing. Some of the Justices, it can be
said with reasonable certainty, did it while simultaneously believing
that Roe was wrongly decided and with a full understanding as well
that Roe's result produced exactly the described substantive evil of the
killing of millions of embryonic human lives. But they did it anyway,
out of concern for the Court's own image and power, lest the Court
be embarrassed, and individuals on it perhaps disparaged, for departing from a precedent that a substantial portion of elite opinion cherished and continues to cherish. They did it, that is, out of vanity and
self-interest. And they did it on the basis of a doctrine of stare decisis
that is deceptively appealing, but in the end became, in the Casey
Court's hands, an arbitrary and dishonest tool of enhanced judicial
power, designed to entrench the Court's specific judgment, its future
judgments, and (if successful) to de-legitimize resistance to the
Court's judgments, even when-especially when-it has departed
grotesquely from its constitutional duties and powers.
If I am right about how wrong Casey is-and I recognize that a
great many others, indeed probably a clear majority of the constitutional law professoriate in America today, approve of the decision, and
of the right to abortion-it tells us some sobering things about the
state of the human condition at the turn of the twenty-first century. In
fact, if I am right about how wrong Casey is, the very fact that so very
many otherwise intelligent and (one would like to believe) morally
aware people would vehemently disagree with everything I have written here, tells us some sobering things. It tells us that, much as we
would like to believe that human beings have become more morally
conscious, more sensitive to injustice and intolerant of clear evil, it
remains the case that we often fail to recognize it in our midst, and
that we are often morally blinded by self-interest.
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The magnitude of the atrocity validated in the Court's abortion
decisions, and our acquiescence in it, invites moral comparison with
other such situations in American and world history. The most obvious American. parallel is slavery, America's original sin. The moral
wrong of human slavery was always self-evident, yet the mental gymnastics of justification and equivocation proved equal to the task of
defending the continued existence of this evil institution for decade
after decade, and led to civil war. Self-interest was able to obscure
moral sense; and quiescence and passivity (and perhaps fear and hypocrisy) were able to silence most criticism, for a long time. Did
Americans at the time, north and south, truly not understand that African slaves were human beings, or that the institution of slavery was
morally indefensible? I doubt it. Rather, they were able to look the
other way or to rationalize their acceptance of injustice. Those few
who did not tended to be regarded as cranks or kooks or intolerant
extremists-moralizing troublemakers unwilling to live and let live, to
respect the social arrangements of others.
So too today. I doubt that more than a small percentage of Americans, if pressed on the point, would dispute the fact that abortion is
the killing of human life in its prenatal state and that, outside of a few
truly extreme situations, such killing is morally unjustifiable. But nobody really wants to be pressed on the point. (And most regard the
"pressers" as kooks, cranks, and intolerant extremists-persons flouting social convention and unwilling to live and let live and respect the
choices of others.) We are willing to shut the problem out of view,
and to suppress moral evaluation in the name of the supposedly more
important American virtue of tolerance of the views and actions of
others. And so we rationalize. Some rationalize the permissibility of
abortion in the name of uncertainty as to the moral entitlement of the
human fetus not to be killed, the necessity to respect difference of
opinion in this regard, and the rhetoric of "choice." Some rationalize
the rationalizations, though they are not themselves persuaded by
them, in the name of some larger good of decorum or social order.
Like the slaveholders of the past, we sometimes know the wrongness
of our institutions but go along anyway, and we sometimes shut our
eyes to, or deny, the wrongness of our institutions as a way to be able
to go along. As Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in his Letterfrom Birmingham Jail: "We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the
hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling si' 4
lence of the good people."
114 MARTIN
(1963).

LUTHER KINGJR., Letter from BirminghamJail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT
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Is it possible for America in the twenty-first century to tolerate,
and embrace in its constitutional law, the gravest of moral evils and
not recognize it as such? Surely we would recognize a true horrible
evil, if there really were one, wouldn't we?
I am not so sure. There is a good basis for questioning the confidence we as a society seem to have in the steady improvement of our.
collective moral discernment. For all our advances in technology, in
sophistication, in ability to learn, recognize and understand, we are
kidding ourselves if we think that our level of moral understanding
has advanced significantly. We are probably no different from the
German people in the 1930s and 1940s.
Is this too harsh a comparison? The "Nazi" card is a heavy rhetorical trump to play. The Holocaust analogy is in some ways obvious-if
abortion is the killing of forty-five million babies by deeming them
non-persons, it is like the Nazi Holocaust inflicted on Jews and others
in the mid-twentieth century. But in other ways the analogy is so dramatic and mortifying that it is a conversation-stopper. It is horrible to
think of Americans who tolerate abortion as complicit in the
equivalent of the Nazi Holocaust. And so that ends the discussion.
For it just cannot be a valid analogy.
Perhaps what is most horrifying of all is the analogy's effect on
our ability to condemn, from a safe distance, what my beloved
teacher, the late Robert M. Cover, once called "the screaming silence
of the German people"'' 5 without realizing that we might have behaved, and might be behaving, no differently. The magnitude of the
evil of abortion forces the comparison.
As noted before, the Supreme Court did not invent abortion.
There might be plenty of abortion, perhaps authorized or permitted
by state laws, even without Roe and Casey. Moreover, the Court is, arguably, not directly responsible for the wrong moral choices of individuals that the Court's decisions permit. Finally, the Court is not
responsible-cannot be responsible, consistent with its constitutional
role-for correcting all injustices, even grave ones. But the Court is
responsible for the injustices that it inflicts on society that are not consistent with, but in fact betray, its constitutional responsibilities. To
the extent that the Court has invalidated essentially all legal restriction of abortion, it has authorized private violence on a scale, and of a
kind, that unavoidably evokes the memories of American slavery and
of the Nazi Holocaust. And by cloaking that authorization in the
115 Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: Liv s OF JUDGES INFAMoUS AS TOOLS OF
TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION

(1856)).
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forms of the law-in the name of the Supreme Law of the Land-the
Court has taught the American people that such private violence is a
right and, by clear implication, that it is alright. Go ahead. The Constitution is on your side. This is among your most cherished constitutional freedoms. Nobody ought to oppose you in your action. We
have said so.
The decision in Casey, reaffirming Roe and itself reaffirmed and
extended in Carhart,in my view exposes the Supreme Court, as currently constituted, as a lawless, rogue institution capable of the most
monstrous of injustices in the name of law, with a smugness and arrogance worthy of the worst totalitarian dictatorships of all time. The
Court, as it stands today, has, with its abortion decisions, forfeited its
legal and moral legitimacy as an institution. It has forfeited its
claimed authority to speak for the Constitution. It has forfeited its
entitlement to have its decisions respected, and followed, by the other
branches of government, by the states, and by the People. The enthusiasm of liberal intelligentsia for the Court's abortion decisions, the

sycophancy of the law professorate, of the legal profession, and of our
elected officials, and the docility of the American people with respect
to our lawless, authoritarian Court rivals the pliancy of the most cowardly, servile peoples toward ruinous, brutal, anti-democratic regimes
throughout world history. We suffer people to commit despicable acts
of private violence and we welcome-some of us revere-a regime
that destroys popular government for the sake of perverted, Orwellian
notions of "liberty." After a twentieth century that saw some of the
worst barbarisms and atrocities ever committed by humankind, at a
time when humankind supposedly had progressed to more enlightened states, we still have not learned. The lesson of the Holocaust"Never Forget"-is lost. We fail to recognize the amazing capacity of
human beings to commit unthinkable, barbaric evil, and of others to
tolerate it. We remember and are aghast at the atrocities of others,
committed in the past, or in distant lands today. But we do not even
recognize the similar atrocities that we ourselves commit, and tolerate,
today.
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